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The European Union (EU) appears nearing the end of a second wave of Islamist-inspired 
terrorism that peaked in 2015.  However, the focus on Islamist terrorism may have diverted 
attention from a more pressing domestic terrorism threat.  While not as lethal as Islamist 
terrorism, the total of non-Islamist terrorist attacks was significantly higher during the same 
timeframe.  Of the non-Islamist attacks, right-wing terrorism accounted for a small percentage, 
but these numbers may be misleading.  How the various EU members define right-wing 
terrorism may be contributing to an underestimation of the threat, but there could also be a 
temporal explanation.  Right-wing terrorism appears to be cyclic, with the last major wave 
ending in the early 2000s.  A concern is a new wave of right-wing terrorism may appear fueled 
by the same grievances that have led to increasing support for right-wing populist parties. 
Right-wing populist parties now have parliamentary representation in 22 of 28 EU 
member states and have a sizeable presence in the European Parliament.  While right-wing 
populist parties have refrained from openly calling for violence against their perceived 
antagonists, the rhetoric of these groups has nonetheless helped to create a climate encouraging 
hatred of outgroups.  These toxic narratives have inspired lone actors to commit acts of domestic 
terrorism around the world.  Could the underlying societal issues and grievances contributing to 
the rise of right-wing populism in Europe also fuel a corresponding rise in right-wing terrorism? 
In determining the nature of future terrorist threats to the EU, this thesis explores the 
relationship between the rise of right-wing populism and its potential impact on domestic 
terrorism.  Specifically, in what ways might the presence of right-wing populist parties in 
government (either at the national or supranational level) effect right-wing terrorism in the EU? 
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In helping to conceptualize the terrorist threat to the EU, this thesis discusses the various 
definitions of terrorism, the goals and strategies of terrorist groups, the current terrorist threat 
assessments, and the latest trends shaping how terrorists operate.  Next, the thesis focuses on 
conceptualizing populism to help understand the us vs. them construct and the demand- and 
supply-side drivers contributing to the rise of right-wing populism in Europe.  This is followed 
by an in-depth look into the current European political and social environment to show how the 
various issues play into right-wing populist narratives.  The European case study offers a unique 
opportunity to analyze right-wing populist politics simultaneously at the state and supranational 
levels.  Also discussed are the various theories underpinning political mobilization, 
radicalization, us vs. them narratives, and terrorism pathways, to understand how right-wing 
populism factors into the radicalization process.  The paper concludes by discussing seven 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The European Union (EU) appears nearing the end of a second wave of Islamist-inspired1 
(also referred to as Jihadist) terrorism that peaked on 13 November 2015 with six simultaneous 
attacks in Paris killing over 130 people and injuring another 400 (Klausen, 2018).  The Paris 
attacks were the worst France had experienced since World War II and the deadliest in Europe 
since the 11 March 2004 Madrid train bombings with 191 fatalities and 2000 injuries (World 
Atlas, 2018).  In 2015 there were 150 fatalities in the EU due to Islamist-inspired terrorism, 
followed by 135 in 2016, 62 in 2017, and 13 in 2018 (Klausen, 2018; EUROPOL, 2019).  One 
could interpret this declining trend as a positive sign.  Unfortunately, focusing solely on the 
lethality of Islamist attacks may be diverting attention from other terrorist threats.  During this 
same timeframe, the number of attacks in the EU motivated by other ideologies was significantly 
greater than those by Islamists.  Non-Islamist terrorists (left- and right-wing, ethno-nationalist, 
separatists, and single interest) accounted for 92% of the failed, foiled and completed attacks in 
the EU in 2015, 91% in 2015, 84% in 2017, and 81% in 2018 (EUROPOL, 2019) (see Appendix 
1 for yearly comparison of attacks by ideology ). 
Inspirations aside, the issue of terrorism remains a major concern across the EU.  A 2018 
YouGov Survey of eleven EU members2 ranked terrorism as the second most important issue, 
surpassed only by immigration. The economy ranked third.  These results are not surprising.  
Since 2015, the combination of terrorism, immigration, and economics, has played a key role in 
                                                 
 
1 Term is often used interchangeably with political Islam or Islamic fundamentalism.  For this thesis, Islamism refers 
to a form of social and political activism advocating public and political life should be guided by Islamic 
principles, specifically full implementation of sharia. 
2 Survey conducted in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, 
Greece, Italy, and Spain (YouGov, 2018). 
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shaping election results at both the national and EU parliamentary levels.  Another issue shaping 
the parliament elections throughout Europe is the surprising rise of right-wing populist parties. 
Right-wing populism is a political ideology which combines right-wing politics and 
populist rhetoric.  These parties have successfully exploited public discontent with mainstream 
political parties, as well as concerns over the economy, immigration, and Islamist terrorism.  
Right-wing populist parties have representation in 22 of 28 EU member national parliaments (see 
Appendix 2 for party representation by country).  Despite the appearance of a common linkage, 
classification of right-wing populism into a single political family is difficult.  In addition to the 
top three issues, European populist agendas also touch on Euroscepticism (also known as EU-
skepticism), globalization, economic austerity measures, social welfare programs, taxes, 
multiculturalism, and nationalism.  Given the complexity and intertwining of issues, right-wing 
populist platforms can be confusing and contradictory at times (e.g., anti-tax but pro-state funded 
social welfare programs).  The one theme linking all right-wing populist groups is an ideology 
centered on exclusion and inequality. 
Often ill-defined and misused in mass media, populism is an appeal to certain segments 
of society who feel their identity or lifestyle is threatened by political or societal changes and 
believe their concerns are ignored by an “elite” group.  While populists are anti-elitist, this is not 
a sufficient condition.  Populist parties are also anti-pluralist (Muller, 2016).  Only these parties 
can represent the people (who tend to be specifically defined).  Thus, besides being anti-
establishment in nature, populism contains an inherent “us vs. them” narrative.  This construct is 
presented as a “zero-sum game” with the gains of one group coming at the expense of another.  
The “us vs. them” dynamic has had a polarizing effect on domestic politics throughout the EU 
and has led to the emergence of a particularly virulent form of right-wing politics. 
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The media interchangeably labels right-wing populist parties as far right, radical right, 
and extreme right, which adds to the confusion when discussing the political agendas of these 
groups.  Mudde (2018) offers a useful conceptual framework for explaining how the terms relate 
to liberal democracies.  As a starting point, it is necessary to position the left from the right based 
on their view on equality.  Whereas the left considers inequalities between people to be artificial; 
the right believes inequalities are natural and are to be defended by the state.  Within this context 
the far left calls for rapid wide-spread changes to the current political, social, and economic 
structure.  The far right, threatened by these changes, looks to reverse them.  However, it is an 
oversimplification to position the far right as just the opposite of the far left.  Mudde (2018) sees 
the far right consisting of two sub-groups: extreme right and the radical right, with the main 
difference centered on their attitude towards democracy.  The extreme right fundamentally 
opposes democracy and does not believe all people should be involved in selecting a country’s 
leadership (e.g., authoritarianism and totalitarianism).  The term radical right best describes 
right-wing ideologies that are accepting of electoral democracy, but oppose certain values, such 
as minority rights and pluralism.  Thus, radical right-wing populist parties tend to combine 
elements of nativism and a desire for a strictly ordered society (Mudde, 2018).  That said, it is 
reasonable to assume some right-wing populist parties’ supporters harbor extreme right views. 
A distinction must also be made between right-wing extremism and right-wing terrorism.  
The right-wing extremist spectrum ranges from subculture-oriented extremists (e.g., fascists, 
neo-Nazis) to legalistic acting parties.  Some extremists may participate in one or multiple right-
wing groups or organizations, whereas others may not participate in any.  While some right-wing 
extremists may be oriented towards violence, this does not mean it is true for all.  A study of 
right-wing extremists in Germany estimated 50% of the 24,000 extremists in the country would 
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be labeled as “violence oriented” (Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2019).3  Similarly, it should 
not be assumed all violent oriented right-wing extremists are terrorists.  Right-wing extremists 
use a variety of politically motivated crimes short of terrorism.  Terrorism, further defined in 
Chapter 2, is the use, or threat, of violence to trigger far-reaching psychological repercussions 
beyond the immediate victim or target (Hoffman, 2017).  However, in the case of right-wing 
terrorism, the deliberate use of violence for political purposes can be hard to ascertain because 
perpetrators rarely issue demands or claim responsibility for the attacks they carry out (Ravndal, 
2018).  As a result, there is some debate on what types of right-wing violence qualify as 
terrorism.  The definitional dilemma is reflected in a recent announcement by German authorities 
who recategorized the 2016 Munich Olympia Mall shootings as a "politically motivated crime" 
(DW Staff, 2019, October 25).  Previously, German authorities did not consider the attack to be 
motivated by a political ideology. 
While right-wing populist groups have refrained from openly calling for any form of 
political violence against perceived antagonists (political or non-political), the rhetoric of these 
groups has nonetheless contributed to a climate encouraging hatred of outgroups.  This toxic 
environment has inspired lone actors to commit acts of mass-casualty domestic terrorism.  On 9 
October 2019, 27-year-old German national Stephan Balliet failed in an attempt to attack a 
Jewish synagogue in Halle, Germany.  The attack coincided with the beginning of Yom Kipper 
and if successful could have killed over fifty worshippers (Der Spiegel Staff, 2019, October 11).  
Balliet’s attack was partially inspired by right-wing attacks outside of Europe.  On 16 March 
2019, 28-year-old Brenton Tarrant (a self-described white supremist and fascist) attacked two 
                                                 
 
3What is interesting about this number is it reflects a 21% increase in violence prone extremists from 2014 yet 
associated violent crimes have decreased by 30% since 2016 (Der Spiegel Staff, June 27). 
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mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand killing 50 people, making it the country’s deadliest 
incident since World War 2 (DW Staff, 2019, April 4b). 
Despite occurring on the other side of the world, the Christchurch attack had at least an 
indirect tie to European right-wing extremism.  Tarrant had previously sent money to Generation 
Identity (Génération Identaire), a French extreme right anti-migrant movement and an Austrian 
branch of the Identitarian movement4 (DW Staff, 2019, April 4b).  Tarrant, an Australian, 
claimed traveling in Europe played a key role in his radicalization process by seeing how 
Muslim immigration had weakened European identity.  Besides Balliet, the Christchurch attacks 
also inspired the perpetrators of racially motivated attacks in Ponway, California (April 27, 
2019) and El Paso, Texas (August 3, 2019) (Weill, 2019).  A commonality to all these incidents 
is the idea of “the Great Replacement” (le Grand Remplacement), a conspiracy theory promoted 
by French writer Renuad Camus that claims a global elite is colluding against the European 
white populations to replace them with non-European peoples (Williams, 2017; Weill, 2019).  
Another French writer associated with this line of thinking is Michel Houellebecq who wrote the 
European bestseller novel Submission (Soumission) which generated controversy and criticism 
for its portrayal of Islam.  Clearly, the toxic sentiments underlying European right-wing 
populism has a global audience. 
Returning to the 2018 YouGov Survey, it did not specifically ask what “terrorists” 
Europeans most feared.  One could logically assume survey participants were thinking about 
Islamist groups like al-Qa’ida or the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)5 who were either 
                                                 
 
4 “Identitarianism” is a white nationalist movement originating in France which portrays Muslim immigration as an 
existential threat (Williams, 2017). 
5 Also known as Da’ish (al-Dawla al‑Islamiya fi al‑Iraq wa al‑Sham).  Prior to the ISIS rebranding, the group was 
referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and before that, al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI). 
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directly or indirectly responsible for the most lethal attacks in Europe in the post-9/11 era (see 
Appendix 3 for list of deadliest attacks in Europe).  While Islamist terrorists remain a credible 
threat to the EU, given the EUROPOL’s Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports (TE-SAT) from 
2016-2019, it is obvious there are other threats.  If Halle, Christchurch and El Paso are any 
indication, the greatest future threat may be domestic terrorism fueled by the same rhetoric, 
issues and grievances contributing to the rise of right-wing populist parties. 
Problem Statement 
Europe has hosted a range of terrorist groups (anarchists, anti-colonialists, Islamists, 
ethno-separatists, etc.) and there are no indications terrorism as a political strategy or tactic will 
go away in the foreseeable future.  Despite the downward trend in fatalities related to Islamist 
attacks, the most recent national-level threat assessments (both European and American) 
continue to primarily focus on the Islamist-inspired threat.  While religion is likely to continue 
playing a key role in inspiring terrorism, research shows secular grievances are increasingly 
becoming a motivating factor.  The continued national-level focus on the Islamist threat may 
cause government officials and researchers to miss the indicators of an emerging threat or cause 
them to underestimate an existing one.  As such, consideration must be given to what might be 
the source of inspiration for future terrorism in the EU. 
Unfortunately, some of the same grievances used to attract followers to terrorist groups 
are the same ones right-wing populist parties are leveraging to attract voters.  This should not be 
too surprising.  Like terrorism, populism is a means of challenging the social and political status 
quo and is considered a “weapon of the weak.”  This concept, in a non-terrorism sense, comes 
from James Scott (1985) who uses the term to encapsulate the ordinary, everyday forms of 
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resistance and their symbolic and ideological underpinnings.6  Similarly, terrorism is also 
considered a weapon of the weak as it is an asymmetrical response to state power (i.e., the power 
ratio of government to the challenger is highly disproportionate).  Unlike terrorism then, 
populism relies on democratic elections to change the status quo.  Ironically, the political 
structure allowing for current right-wing populist gains in multiple European parliaments may 
also serve to marginalize these gains with the formation of counter-populist coalitions at both the 
national and EU levels.  Continued marginalization could lead populist parties to consider more 
radical agendas.  Even if populist parties continue to rely on the electoral system to achieve their 
objectives, a lack of success in addressing the concerns of their support base could lead to 
organizational splits and the development of factions more willing to engage in political 
violence, to include terrorism. 
Research Question 
While right-wing populist groups have refrained from openly calling for acts of violence, 
the rhetoric of these groups has nonetheless created a climate fueling and encouraging an 
extreme hatred of outgroups.  Could the underlying societal issues and grievances associated 
with the rise of right-wing populism inspire the next major terrorist threat in Europe? 
In determining the nature of future terrorist threats to the EU, the purpose of this thesis is 
to explore the relationship between the rise of right-wing populism and its potential impact on 
domestic terrorism.  Specifically, in what ways might the presence of right-wing populist parties 
in government (either national or EU) affect right-wing terrorism in the EU? 
 
                                                 
 
6 Scott (1985) feels an inordinate amount of attention has been paid to the rare occurrences of open revolt, and too 




This thesis is structured as a case study to understand how the issues contributing to the 
rise of right-wing populism could shape future terrorist behavior in Europe.  Chapter 2 provides a 
conceptual foundation for determining future terrorist threats by discussing: the various 
definitions of terrorism; the goals and strategies of the terrorist groups; the current terrorist threat 
assessments; and the latest trends shaping how terrorists operate.  Similarly, Chapter 3 provides a 
conceptual foundation for understanding right-wing populism by discussing the components of 
populism and the underpinnings of the “us vs. them” construct, as well as the demand- and 
supply-side drivers contributing to the rise of right-wing populism in Europe.  Chapter 4 
provides an in-depth look into the current European political and social environment to show 
how the various issues play into right-wing populist narratives.  The European case study offers a 
unique opportunity to analyze right-wing populist politics simultaneously at the state and 
supranational levels.  Chapter 5 addresses the various theories underpinning political 
mobilization, radicalization, “us vs. them” narratives, and terrorism pathways to understand how 
supporters of right-wing populism could transition towards using terrorism as a tactic.  This 
thesis concludes by looking at seven hypotheses theorizing how right-wing populism could 
directly or indirectly affect the future domestic terrorist threat to the EU. 
Significance of Research 
This thesis has a twofold purpose.  The first is to provide a better understanding how the 
rise of right-wing populism could shape domestic terrorism in the EU.  Second, to contribute to 
the broader discussion on the influences of domestic terrorism. 
The EU is expected to face a credible domestic (or homegrown) terrorist threat, both 
Islamist and non-Islamist inspired, for the foreseeable future.  The most unpredictable domestic 
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terrorist threat is from small groups and individuals.  Given the ability of this smaller element to 
blend into their local surroundings, attacks can occur with little or no warning.  As a result, 
indicators of a pending attack are mostly hidden from traditional intelligence and law 
enforcement collection means, which are primarily oriented at transnational threats.  
Determining the nature of the threat is extremely important, as the strategy to address one aspect 
can serve as the catalyst for radicalization of another.  A failure to understand how the differing 
aspects interact risks mischaracterizing the current situation and misinterpreting what it means 




Chapter 2: Conceptualizing the Terrorist Threat 
In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks targeting the United States (henceforth 
9/11), the world entered a new “age of terrorism” with the beginning of a Global War on 
Terrorism.  Despite this global initiative to mitigate the threat, it was not long after 9/11 that 
Europeans had their own dates to remember, the 11 March 2004 Madrid train bombings (referred 
to as 11-M) and the 7 July 2005 London bombings (referred to as 7/7).  Prompted by these 
attacks and others around the world, researchers have produced a significant amount of literature 
on terrorism.  Given the global rise of groups like al-Qa’ida and ISIS, a considerable part of this 
material focuses on religiously inspired terrorism; however, Islamist groups do not represent the 
entire threat to the EU.  While not receiving the media coverage of their Islamic counterparts, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, non-Islamist terrorist groups (e.g., right- and left-wing, ethno-nationalists 
and separatists, and single interest) account for a greater combined percentage of attacks in 
Europe.  To fully grasp the nature of the current and future terrorist threat the EU faces, it is 
necessary to take a broader look at the conceptual issues related to the topic.  Failure to do so 
will result in a myopic perspective concentrating on only one aspect of the problem. 
Defining Terrorism 
Despite the vast amount of literature on the topic, defining terrorism remains problematic.  
The concept of terrorism is heavily contested and it is difficult to arrive at a satisfactory 
definition distinguishing terrorism from other politically motivated violent behavior (e.g., riots, 
kidnappings, assassinations, insurgencies) or the illegal activities supporting terrorist activities 
(e.g., armed robberies, counterfeiting, drug trafficking).  At the very foundation of all political 
violence are political grievances and a willingness to use violence to communicate discontent and force a 
resolution.  One way to conceptualize how terrorism fits in the political violence spectrum is based on a 
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movement’s shift in capability and intentions.  Whelan (2016) sees terrorism as a movement’s desire to 
increase its capabilities (e.g., membership and resources) and to “militarize” its action (see Figure 2-1).  A 
shift to terrorism reflects a change in capabilities and intentions, as the group’s increased capabilities 
enable them to move from employing communicative violence to violence which aims to erode the 
opposition’s will and power.  In short, terrorism marks the first stage whereby a group attempts to control 
the violence employed for a cause (Whelan, 2016). 
While we can theoretically place terrorism along the capability spectrum, it is still 
difficult to define as it holds similarities with other forms of political violence.  In their research on 
terrorism in the 1980s, Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman compiled over a hundred academic 
definitions of terrorism, which when coded contained twenty-two definitional elements 
(Weinberg et al., 2004).  Twenty years later Weinberg et al. (2004) found little success towards 
creating a universal definition as they found seventy-three definitions with twenty definitional 








Insurgency and proto-states are groups which have the 
capability to not only use asymmetric tactics against hard 
government targets, but also hold sufficient power to control 
territory and administer it, providing the social service of a 
state to a basic level (e.g., taxation, education, healthcare). 
 
Guerilla violence involves the use of asymmetric tactics  
against government forces and authority.  This form of 
violence requires greater numbers, equipment, and financing. 
 
Terrorism holds a bridging position within the capability 
spectrum.  It is linked to the to the emotion-based, less 
organized forms of protest, but is often used by groups which 
aspire to gain capabilities and evolve into groups able to use 
guerilla tactics, and perhaps even hold territory in the future. 
 
The evolution from individual to group protest represents 
an increase in capabilities; namely cause membership.  
However, there is no sustained organizational capability. 
 Proto-state (e.g., 
Hibzallah, ISIS) 
 
 Insurgency (e.g., 
Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam) 
 
 Guerilla violence (e.g., 
Irish Republican Army) 
 
 Terrorism (e.g., Red 
Army Faction) 
 
 Group protest violence 
(e.g., rioting) 
 





elements (see Appendix 5 for the definitional elements from both studies).  Trying to incorporate 
all the various elements makes for a cumbersome definition with little analytic value. 
Adding to the conceptual confusion is the stretching of the term over time.  To some it is 
a tactic used only by religious fundamentalists and ultra-nationalists.  To others, the definition 
includes single-interest groups (e.g., environmentalists and anti-abortionists).  Others may 
include transnational criminal organizations and internationally based gangs (e.g., Mexican drug 
trafficking organization and Mara Salvatrucha/MS-13) by using the label of narcoterrorism.  
Even non-violent actors are labeled as terroristic (e. g., cyberterrorists).  Then there is the added 
dynamic concerning the legitimacy of the actor.  For instance, Yasser Arafat’s claim: “The 
difference between a revolutionary and a terrorist … lies in the reasons for which each fights” 
(Hoffman, 2017, p. 17).  Which in turn leads to the much-used cliché, “one man’s terrorist is 
another’s freedom fighter.”  Given the multitude of definitions and related definitional elements, 
the word “terrorism” means different things to different people (academics, policy makers, law 
enforcement, participants, victims, and society at large). 
With so many definitions already existing, the goal is not to create another.  This thesis 
uses the definition created by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) team at the University of 
Maryland which defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence 
by a nonstate actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, 
or intimidation” (LaFree, 2018).  Based on this definition, the GTD team has six criteria to 
determine whether an incident is included in the database.  The three following criteria must be 
present for an incident to be included: it must be intentional; it must include some level of 
violence or immediate threat of violence; and the perpetrators must be sub-national actors 
(LaFree, 2018).  Additionally, at least two of the following three criteria must be present: the act 
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must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal; there must be evidence 
of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience than the 
immediate victims; and the action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities 
(LaFree, 2018).  Underscoring the difficulty in defining terrorism, the Director of National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) admits there are 
incidents sharing many of these characteristics that are not included in the GTD (LaFree, 2018). 
Terrorism is further distinguished between transnational (or international) and domestic 
variants, the significance of which is the distinction of the target of the violence and the audience 
targeted.  Transnational terrorism is “when an incident in one country involves perpetrators, 
victims, institutions, governments, or citizens of another country” (Rosendorf and Sandler, 2005, 
p. 172).  Domestic terrorism is “when an incident involves perpetrators, victims, and an audience 
of the country in which the incident occurs” (Rosendorf and Sandler, 2005, p. 172).  These 
differentiations are useful for understanding the intended victims.  Most transnational terrorist 
attacks target civilians, or noncombatants in military lexicon, while domestic terrorism tends to 
focus more on combatants, or state institutions (military, security, law enforcement, etc.)  
(Sánchez-Cuenca de la Calle, 2009).  The exception is extreme-right wing terrorism; where 
between 1965-2000, noncombatants accounted for 82% of victims (Sánchez-Cuenca de la Calle, 
2009).  Given the 2019 attacks in Halle, Christchurch and El Paso, right-wing terrorism may be 
taking a page from Islamist terrorism and returning to targeting civilians. 
Based on the various definitions and labels, it is easy to see why there is no universally 
accepted definition.  Unfortunately, the conceptual confusion is not limited to academia.  
Terrorism definitions and classifications of specific incidents can vary by country and even by 
different agencies within the same country.  Definitions across government departments and 
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agencies tend to reflect their missions and legal authorities to address the problem.  For example, 
the primary division among U.S. agencies is between foreign (external) and domestic (internal) 
based threats but this is not always clear cut.  The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
alone has sixteen categories/definitions related to transnational and domestic terrorism/ 
extremism (see Appendix 6).  The DHS list of definitions has another term widely used in U.S. 
and European government documents, homegrown violent extremist (HVE).  HVEs are 
individuals supporting political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization 
but acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization.  HVEs are considered 
distinct from traditional domestic terrorists who engage in acts of violence without direction 
from or influence from a foreign actor.  In short, HVEs represent a combination of both domestic 
and transnational grievances further blurring traditional definitions of terrorism. 
Even defining a specific category of terrorism is challenging.  Adequately classifying 
right-wing terrorism is difficult due to the lack of clarity among the different concepts used to 
describe this form of political violence.  Based on various national definitions and selection 
criteria, a significant amount of violent crimes committed by individuals or groups motivated by 
an extreme right-wing agenda are not categorized as terrorism by EUROPOL but rather as “hate 
crimes” (Koehler, 2016).  As a result, incidents of right-wing terrorism are likely underreported. 
Defining Terrorists 
When one thinks of terrorists, what likely comes to mind are organized groups with a 
chain of command or a hierarchical organizational structure that persists over time, and have the 
ability to project power globally (e.g., al-Qa’ida, ISIS, Hizballah, etc.).  However, on the other 
end of the spectrum are individuals who conduct terrorist attacks but are not members of any 
known organization and who have no formal links to a specific group.  Between these two 
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extremes is a range of adaptations.  It is important then to clarify how the terms are being used to 
avoid creating an inaccurate picture.  For example, when discussing right-wing terrorism, it is 
important to note there is no comparison to groups with a global presence like al-Qa’ida or ISIS.  
Drawing these inaccurate parallels can make it harder for security agencies to detect and react 
because a comparison with Islamist extremism creates political and tactical biases that hinder the 
ability to detect a much different threat (Koehler, 2016). 
While it is still possible for large, formalized terrorist groups to take shape, they are 
unlikely to resemble traditional organizational models.  With the proliferation of post-9/11 
counter terrorism measures, many terrorist groups embrace an operational model referred to as 
“leaderless resistance.”  This concept is based on a cell structure where cells do not report to a 
central headquarter or a single leader for direction and operate independently of each other.  
Lacking a centralized command and control structure, these cells draw inspiration from a larger 
ideological movement.  Often attributed to white supremacist Louis Beam, the originator of this 
concept was Ulius Louis Amoss, an anti-communist who developed the strategy in the early 
1960s to prevent a communist takeover of the U.S. (Beam, 1992).  While intended for a specific 
audience, Beam’s 1992 essay is available in multiple languages and easily accessible on the 
internet.  This example shows ideological differences do not prevent these groups from learning 
from each other’s successes and failures, which allows for a more readily adaptable threat. 
A derivative of leaderless resistance is lone actors or lone wolves.  As the name implies, 
these individuals prepare and commit violent acts alone, outside of any command structure and 
without material aid from any group.  Interestingly, in a study of 119 individuals who engaged in 
or planned to engage in lone-actor terrorism, Gill, Horgan, and Deckert (2014) found lone actors 
tend to fall into three primary groups: religiously inspired (43%), right-wing (34%), and single 
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issue (18%).7  However, this was not always the case.  Prior to 2001, only 7.8% of the lone 
actors were religiously inspired, with right-wing extremists making up 32.5% and single-issue 
offenders 47.6% (Gill et al, 2014).  Given the high proportion of religious and right-wing lone 
actors, it would not be surprising to see similarities in the tactics and techniques used by both. 
It may be difficult for some to conceptualize the threat posed by lone actors, but their acts 
can be quite lethal and extremely difficult to prevent.  Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the deadliest 
terrorist attack in the U.S. (168 killed) was the 19 April 1995 Oklahoma City bombing carried 
out by Timothy McVeigh (aided by Terry Nicholas) (Hoffman, 2017).  Lone actors are also 
responsible for some of the deadliest attacks in Europe.  Inspired by ISIS, Mohamed Lahouaiej-
Bouhlel, a dual citizen of Tunisia and France, killed 86 people and injured 458 in Nice, France 
(July 14, 2016) (Counter Extremis Project, 2019).  On 22 July 2011, far-right extremist Anders 
Behring Breivik executed dual attacks in Oslo and Utøya (referred to as the July 22 attacks), 
killing 77 and injuring 319, the deadliest incident in Norway since World War II (Ray, 2018). 
The Effect of Social Media 
The National Intelligence Council (2017) assesses the threat from terrorism will increase 
in the coming decades as small groups and individuals leverage new technologies, ideas, and 
relationships to their advantage.  The internet will play a crucial facilitating role with this threat 
as it allows individuals to interact with other radicals and extremists in ways other than face-to-
face.  The importance of formal terrorist organizations appears to be increasingly overshadowed 
by the ideology inspiring and motivating individuals to conduct acts of violence. 
                                                 
 
7 Historically, there have been very few lone-actor incidents involving left-wing or nationalist inspired individuals 
(Gill et al., 2014). 
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Besides negating the need for physical interaction with other like-minded individuals, the 
internet supplies the technical knowledge for individuals to maximize the effect of their attacks.  
Just like the use of dynamite by the anarchist’s in the 19th century, the internet has proved to be a 
game changer for those trying to draw attention to their cause.  Today’s individual has access to 
much deadlier technology and the internet provides “do it yourself” knowledge to produce 
weapons and how to best use them.  The internet dynamic is important, as it provides extremists 
across ideologies an opportunity (either directly or indirectly) to create common "playbooks" 
based on lessons learned, as in the case with Beam’s leaderless resistance. 
Just as concerning, Precht (2007) found radicalization appeared to be occurring quicker 
than just a few years before the publication of his report.  Over a decade later, taking into 
account the increasing role of social media, it is reasonable to assume the radicalization process 
has continued to accelerate.  Social media allows violent extremists to spread their ideology to a 
much wider audience, faster and more effectively than ever before.  Social media has also 
changed how individuals become radicalized, replacing the traditional face-to-face meeting 
places used for recruitment and radicalization.  This obviously has major implications for lone 
actors.  For instance, ISIS has created a vast global library of propaganda that influenced 
terrorists such as Omar Mateen, who killed 49 people in the 2016 Pulse nightclub attack in 
Orlando, Florida (Bergen, 2019).  Mateen never met with anyone in ISIS and never traveled to 
Iraq or Syria; his radicalization was entirely driven by what he viewed on the Internet.  Similarly, 
Brenton Tarrant (see Chapter 1) tapped into a large library of white nationalist material from 
around the world available on the internet (Bergen, 2019).  Additionally, both Tarrant and 
Stephen Balliet live streamed their attacks for posterity and motivation purposes (Der Speigel, 
October 11).  Whether a Jihadist or a white supremacist, individuals can become radicalized with 
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the help of what they watch or read online.  Radicalization takes place in the social climate in 
which people live.  The internet and social media allow terrorists unprecedented ways to network 
globally and the ability to propagate their ideologies. 
The Goals and Strategies of Terrorism 
Although goals amongst terrorist groups and lone actors vary, Kydd and Walter (2006) 
identify five enduring themes: regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control, 
and status quo maintenance.  Regime change is the removal of the current government and its 
replacement with one led by the terrorists or at least one more in line with their hard-core 
objectives.  Territorial change is taking territory away from a state either to establish a new state 
or to join another state.  Policy change is a broader category of lesser demands, such as stopping 
migration.  Social control constrains the behavior of individuals, rather than the states, such as 
oppressing a minority population.  Finally, status quo maintenance is the support of an existing 
government or a territorial arrangement against political groups seeking to change it.  Some 
organizations hold multiple goals and may view one as helping another. Of these goals, right-
wing extremists are likely to see violence as a means of obtaining the latter three.  Arguably, 
these are the same three objectives of right-wing populist parties. 
To achieve their long-term objectives, terrorists can pursue a variety of strategies.  Kydd 
and Walter (2006) identity five strategies terrorists employ: attrition, intimidation, provocation, 
spoiling, and outbidding.  Of these strategies, outbidding and provocation are the most relevant 
for organizations competing against each other or dealing with factional splintering.  In line with 
populist narratives, splinter groups seek to convince the party support base they are the only 
alternative capable of protecting “the people’s” interests and that more moderate competitors are 
weak and untrustworthy.  Extremists engaged in outbidding use violence to convince the public 
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the extreme factions have greater resolve to fight the enemy than rival political groups, and 
therefore are worthy of public support.  Additionally, provocation would help in trying to get the 
government or other adversaries to overact, which in turn can be used as a propaganda tool to 
help mobilize support for the cause. 
In understanding the linkage between goals and strategy, it is necessary to consider the 
group’s ideology as this serves as both a motivational factor for participating in terrorist acts as 
well as attracting societal support.  Terrorist groups rely on ideological arguments for 
recruitment and to garner financial or other support from local communities.  However, the effect 
of ideology should not be treated as a constant across terrorist categories.  As discussed in 
Chapter 5, its impact can vary from group to group, and from individual to individual. 
Terrorism in Europe 
The 2019 EU TE-SAT identifies five broad ideological categories of terrorist threats 
targeting EU members: Jihadist (or Islamist), left-wing/anarchist, right-wing, ethno-
nationalist/separatists, and single-interest.  Compared to previous years, in 2018, the number of 
attacks and the number of victims in the EU dropped significantly across terrorism of all 
ideological tendencies (see Appendix 1 for comparison of years 2015-2018).  In 2018, 
individuals or groups associated with the five categories were responsible for 129 (foiled, failed 
and completed) attacks in nine EU Member States (see Figure 2-1).  Thirteen people died in 
these attacks and 53 were injured, with all the deaths attributed to Islamist attacks (EUROPOL, 




The 2018 numbers do not appear to be an anomality.  In 2017, nationalists/separatists 
accounted for 67% of the plots/attacks (99), Islamists 16% (33), left-wing 12% (24) and right-
wing 3% (5) (EUROPOL, 2018, p. 9).  Combined, these attacks resulted in 68 deaths and 844 
injuries.  The majority of the fatalities and casualties (62 and 819 respectively) were the result of 
Islamist-inspired attacks in six countries (UK 35, Spain 16, Sweden 5, France 3, Finland 2, and 
Germany 1) (EUROPOL, 2018, p. 23).  However, ethno-nationalists/separatists accounted for 
137 attacks.  The least amount of attacks was attributed to right-wing extremists (five attacks and 
one death) (EUROPOL, 2018, p. 51). 
Despite the low number of attacks associated with right-wing terrorism from 2016 to 
2018, EU Security Commissioner Sir Julian King claims there is a growing threat of right-wing 
extremism and there is not “a single EU Member State that is not affected in some way by the 
phenomenon” (EUROPOL, 2018, p. 51).  An assertion supported by Peter Neumann, head of the 
London-based International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, who sees an increase in the 
number of hate crimes and right-wing “terrorist violence” over the past five years (France 24 
Figure 2-2: Terrorist Plots/Attacks in EU, 2018 (EUROPOL, 2019, p. 68) 
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Staff, 2019).  While extremism is not synonymous with terrorism, it is reasonable to assume, 
based on the radicalization models discussed in Chapter 5, there should be some increase in 
terrorist attacks along with increased levels of violent extremism.  Why then the discrepancy in 
the number of attacks and the perception of the threat?  Ravndal (2019) believes since 
EUROPOL’s data relies on EU states’ own reporting based on different legal definitions of 
terrorism, the numbers and portrayal of right-wing terrorism are understated compared to other 
types.  Sir King also mentioned the possibility of underreporting (EUROPOL, 2018).  A reason 
for the underreporting may be tied to the conceptualization of right-wing extremism which is 
fragmented and manifests itself in a variety of forms.  Right-wing groups reflect a variety of 
goals, ranging from the condemnation of the political establishment and the membership of 
international organizations (e.g. NATO and the EU), to the rejection of asylum policies, migrants 
and individuals and groups associated with different racial, ethnic, religious (e.g. Jews and 
Muslims), or political backgrounds (EUROPOL, 2019).  Despite the lack of empirical support, 
there is a strong belief among EU member states that there is an increased right-wing threat. 
Determining the Future Terrorist Threat 
Based on data from GTD, 2017 marked the third consecutive year of declining numbers 
of combined terrorist attacks around the world (domestic, HVE, and transnational).  Despite this 
trend, terrorism remains above historical levels.  In 2017, 369 groups (not all Islamist inspired) 
conducted 10,900 terrorist attacks around the world, killing over 26,400 people (START, 2018).  
To put this into perspective, the decade prior to the 9/11 attacks, both frequency and lethality of 
terrorism each year was less than one-third of what occurred in 2017 (START, 2018).  It appears 
terrorism will stay above historical levels for the foreseeable future.  But what will the future 
terrorist threat look like? 
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The U.S. National Security Strategy sees the primary threat coming from “jihadist 
terrorists and transnational criminal organizations,” of which the former presents the most 
dangerous (White House, 2017).  This concern is also reflected in the 2019 US Intelligence 
Community’s World Wide Threat Assessment, which states Sunni extremists will remain the 
primary terrorist threat to the U.S., with U.S.-based HVEs the most frequent and unpredictable 
threat (Coats, 2019).  The Islamist threat also carries over to European assessments as well.  The 
United Kingdom’s CONTEST Strategy also has Islamist terrorism as the foremost terrorist threat 
(Her Majesty’s Government, 2018).  Even Lithuania, a country that has not experienced an 
attack by Islamist terrorists, sees ISIS as a major threat (Republic of Lithuania, 2019). 
While the Islamist threat appears enduring, when looking at the number of terrorist 
attacks committed in Europe, solely focusing on this specific threat does not represent a 
complete picture of the threat.  Looking at the EU TE-SATs since 2016, proportionally it was 
non-Islamist terrorists who conducted the most attacks.  The disproportionate number of 
causalities from Islamist terrorism likely explains the continued focus despite the greater number 
of non-Islamist attacks. Given this disparity between the two categories, could the various 
national level intelligence assessments be off the mark?  If so, why? 
An influential theoretical framework for understanding contemporary terrorism is 
Rapoport’s (2002) Wave Theory of the Rebel Terrorism which sees contemporary 
terrorist/extremist movements as being divided into four distinct phases:  Anarchist, 1880s-
1920s; Anti-Colonial, 1920s-1960s; New Left, 1960s-1990s; and the current Islamist phase 
(started in the 1980s).  While each wave has a distinct focus, a “revolution” to create a New 
World order is an overarching theme.  The Anarchist Wave followed in the footsteps of the 
revolutions that transformed European politics in the 19th century and fundamentally changed 
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how political extremists would act.  At the turn of the century, political extremists felt the 
traditional techniques of producing mass uprising (e.g., pamphlets, books, meetings, 
demonstrations, etc.) were obsolete and a new means of communicating to the masses was 
required.  One of these new methods was based on Carlo Pisacane’s theory of “propaganda by 
deed” which saw violence as not only necessary to generate publicity for one’s cause, but “to 
inform, educate, and ultimately rally the masses behind the revolution” (Hoffman, 2017, p. 5). 
The Anarchist wave was followed by the Anti-Colonial wave spurred by the dismantling 
of empires after World War 1 and 2 and the desire for national self-determination.  The late 
1960s witnessed the birth of the New Left wave, a product of the Cold War that saw terrorist 
groups emerge in the developed world (e.g., American Weather Underground, West German Red 
Army Faction/, Italian Red Brigade, Japanese Red Army, and the French Action Directe) who 
envisioned themselves as vanguards for liberating the exploited masses of the Third World.  Out 
of this wave would emerge the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) seen as 
“internationalizing” terrorism with such spectacular events as airline hijackings and the 1972 
Munich Olympic attack.  The fourth and current Religious wave began in 1979, influenced in 
part by the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran by Islamic fundamentalists and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. 
Rapoport’s analysis found a wave’s duration is determined by a combination of factors 
including internal weakness of the group, generational change, and external pressures.  Based on 
these factors, each wave has a life span, which based on the first three waves is approximately 
forty years.  Based on the previously discussed government threat assessments, it appears the 
current phase is likely to last longer than the previous non-religious waves.  However, a point to 
keep in mind is the waves tend to overlap, so it is reasonable to assume by the end of a wave, the 
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signs of the next wave will start to appear.  So even though the religious wave has lasted longer 
than anticipated, it does not rule out that another wave has already begun. 
While Rapoport’s theory provides a reasonable conceptual model for understanding 
contemporary terrorism, it is not without critics.  Parker and Sitter (2016) propose an alternative 
framework for analysis based on the idea that terrorism comes in four different strains.  The four 
strains they identify are Nationalism, Socialism, Religious Extremism, and Social Exclusion.  
While the first three strains can easily be seen in Rapoport’s waves, the idea of Social Exclusion 
(based on race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, etc.) is noticeably missing.  Parker and Sitter (2016) 
feel the four strains fit the historical record better and help explain how terrorism spreads and 
evolves from one period to the next.  The strains analogy helps to explain the cyclic, enduing 
nature of right-wing terrorism, and why this threat can co-exist with the Islamist threat as both 
focus on social exclusion. 
Regardless if terrorism follows a wave or a strain, much like the previous threat 
estimates, the literature addressing the future remains primarily focused on the Islamist-inspired 
threats.  Laqueur (2018) touches on right-wing groups, but believes European polices have kept 
it in check, as such, the bulk of his work focuses on ISIS and Al-Qa’ida.  Celso’s (2015) analysis 
of a Fifth Wave also focuses on jihadi groups.  An exception is Kaplan (2007) who characterizes 
the next wave as New Tribalism.  Kaplan’s research is based on groups like the Khmer Rouge 
(Kampuchea) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (Uganda and surrounding area), as a result, the 
nature of this threat is a more localized third-world threat than a transnational one.  Motivation 
aside, conceptually the localized threat supports the trend of increased domestic and homegrown 
terrorism within the EU. 
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Interestingly, despite the proportionally higher number of left-wing attacks in the 
EUROPOL reports, none of the future threat assessments address this issue.  Nevertheless, one 
of the side effects of increasing right-wing sentiment is a corresponding growth in left-wing 
extremism.  Left-wing extremists are stepping up attacks on right-wing groups and political 
parties both in the US and Europe.  An organization common to both regions is Antifa (short for 
anti-fascist) which is made up of loosely affiliated, left-leaning anti-racist groups that originally 
emerged in response to far-right groups.  Anitfa does not have a  unified structure or national 
leadership but has emerged in the form of local bodies/cells.8  As early as 2016, the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation had warned state and 
local officials Antifa had become increasingly confrontational and was engaging in domestic 
terrorism (Meyer, 2017).  Antifa members claim violence is necessary to combat 
authoritarianism, implying the use of force is intrinsic to their political agenda (Williams, 2017).  
A perceived increased threat from the left could lead to a corresponding increase in right-wing 
extremists’ willingness to use violence to meet objectives.  
Chapter Conclusions 
The first issue in trying to conceptualize the terrorist threat to Europe is defining the 
problem.  As reflected by the various definitions, it often comes down to the perspective of the 
researcher, the agency responsible for addressing the problem, and the individuals who choose to 
participate in violent political action.  The “freedom fighter versus terrorist” debate best 
illustrates the range of perspectives.  These definitional issues in turn impact threat 
                                                 
 
8 A tactic associated with Antifa and similar left-wing groups is the “black bloc” a reference to groups wearing black 
clothing and protective gear to conceal wearers' identities.  The tactic allows participants to appear as one large 
unified mass.  This tactic was developed in the 1980s by European left-wing groups as a means of “popular 
resistance to the police state and the New World Order” (Rossman, 2017). 
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characterization.  This is exemplified by the problem of gauging the threat posed by right-wing 
terrorism in Europe.  EUROPOL’s TE-SAT data relies on EU member states’ reporting based on 
their respective legal definitions of terrorism.  Without a consistent definition there is a risk the 
reported number of right-wing terrorist incidents are understated (i.e., categorizing as hate crime 
vs. terrorism).  Clearly, there is a disconnect between the number of reported incidents in Europe 
and EU member states’ perception of the right-wing threat. 
Definitional issues aside, there should be no disagreement Europe currently faces a 
diverse terrorist threat with both transnational and domestic vectors.  While the various national 
intelligence estimates continue to focus primarily on the transnational aspect of the threat, it 
appears domestic or homegrown variants pose a greater threat based on number of incidents.  
Adding to the complexity of both the transnational and domestic terrorist threat is the changing 
organizational structure of extremist groups influenced by the concept of leaderless resistance 
and lone actors “united” by the internet and social media. 
Online engagement provides the opportunity for anyone to get involved in far right 
activism.  The process is not led by any one individual or organization, but by networks of 
activists in different countries who use a range of social media platforms and websites to focus 
on issues that cut across state borders.  By facilitating cross-border collaboration, social media 
fuels the internationalization of extreme right-wing movements.  A person living in Australia can 
donate to a European Identitarian cause or threaten someone without ever leaving home.  
Research has demonstrated a number of clear areas in which online communication is helping to 
fuel the rise of right-wing extremism by facilitating the dissemination of extremist material to 
new constituents (Shapova, 2018).  Online communication channels enable right-wing extremists 
to broadcast their activities and terrorist attacks (as with Christchurch and Halle) to a global 
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audience.  Combined with the higher proportion of right-wing lone actors, this makes for an 
extremely lethal combination.  Compounding the situation, extreme right-wing supporters are 
gravitating towards lesser-known parts of the web and displaying greater security awareness, 
which will make it even harder to detect emerging threats (Wilson, 2019). 
As for the future threat to Europe, there appears to be some disagreement.  If Rapoport's 
wave theory is correct, a new wave threat could be emerging; however, none of the national-
level threat assessments offer any insight into new threats.  If Parker and Sitter’s strain theory is 
correct, future threats will be a pre-existing one reenergized by a new political or identity crisis.  
Two of their strains are particularly relevant to the rise of right-wing populism, nationalism and 
social exclusion.  Although a few of the assessments touch on the potential threat from right-
wing extremism, the EUROPOL numbers do not support those conclusions.  However, one must 
be careful when focusing on the current numbers.  While ethno-separatists are responsible for the 
greatest number of attacks, these are geographically clustered in a few countries and do not pose 
a broad threat to the EU.  What other issue or set of grievances might serve as the catalyst for the 
next threat? 
Returning to right-wing terrorism in Europe, while the number of attacks is currently low, 
this may be more than a case of underreporting.  Ravndal (2018) suggests right-wing terrorism 
comes in waves, with the last wave in Europe beginning around the late 1980s and ending during 
the early 2000s.  The concern is a new outbreak of right-wing terrorism could start based on 
grievances related to the recent migration crisis, the lingering effects of the European debt crisis, 
and Islamist terrorism which has fueled growing support for radical right-wing parties (discussed 
further in Chapter 4).  Coincidentally, these are the same issues contributing to the rise of right-
wing populism, one of the most politically polarizing phenomena of the 21st century.  
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Chapter 3: Conceptualizing Populism 
Populism, an identity-driven form of political mobilization, is spreading globally and is 
found in Europe, Latin America, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa 
(Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017).  Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev refers to the current 
populist surge as the “Age of Populism” (Müller, 2016).  The commonality of the emergence of 
populism in all regions is it functions as a warning sign of a pending political crisis (Judis, 2016).  
This crisis is due to a perception that existing policies, created and defended by mainstream 
political parties, are at odds with public desires, fears, and concerns. 
Regardless of geographical context, populism is a political philosophy supporting the 
rights and power of the common citizen in a struggle against a perceived corrupt elite.  Based on 
the results of the 2016 US and European elections and the 2016 UK public referendum on 
leaving the EU (Brexit), much has been written about populism.  As with terrorism, despite the 
increase in academic and media coverage, a universally accepted definition of populism is just as 
contested.  Populism is identified with particular classes (e.g., the petty bourgeoise, blue collar 
workers, etc.) motivated by fears (modernization, globalization, migration, etc.) or feelings of 
anger, frustration, and resentment.  Populism is used to simultaneously describe, right-wing 
parties in Europe, left-wing presidents in Latin America, and both Democrat and Republican 
political candidates in the US.  The term is so broadly used it is becoming a catch-all phrase 
which can mask what candidates and parties are trying to accomplish. 
Defining Populism 
While populism has received a significant amount of attention since 2016, it is not a new 
phenomenon.  One of the first political parties to use a populist platform was the People's Party, 
a short lived American agrarian-based, anti-establishment party founded in the late 19th century 
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(Judis, 2016).  One of the first populist movements in Europe was the 19th century Russian 
Narodnik (populist) movement which sought to mobilize the rural class to resist the Tsarist 
government.  Also short lived, the significance of this group is some members later transitioned 
into one of Europe’s first terrorist groups, Narodnaya Volya (People’s Will) (Rapoport, 2002). 
Despite the global growth of populist parties and politicians, the concept is easily 
misunderstood.  Müller (2016) best sums this up when he writes “for all the talk about 
populism…it is far from obvious that we know what we are talking about” (p. 2).  The main 
critiques against definitions of populism is they are too broad and can potentially apply to all 
political actors, movements, and parties.  As Canovan (2005) writes, populism has an “awkward 
conceptual slipperiness.”  An example of the conceptual confusion is found in Populism: Its 
Meaning and National Characteristics in which different contributors define populism as an 
ideology, a movement, and a syndrome (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017).  Further complicating 
things, in different regions populism tends to be equated, or conflated, with distinctly different 
phenomena.  For instance, in the European context, populism is often associated to anti-
immigration and xenophobia, while in Latin America it alludes to clientelism and economic 
mismanagement (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017). 
According to Müller (2016), the reason for the confusion is there is nothing like a theory 
of populism.  Nor is there an acknowledged common history, ideology, program or social base 
(Canova, 2005).  As a result, there is not a coherent set of criteria for explaining when political 
actors turn populist.  Since populists do not claim a defining text or ideology, academics and 
journalists use the term to describe a diverse range of political candidates and parties.  Some of 
the characteristics and political tactics associated with populism can also be associated with non-
populist politicians and political parties.  As Müller points out, every politician in poll driven 
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democracies wants to appeal to “the people.”  Thus, like terrorism, it is difficult conceptualizing 
exactly what is populism. 
Another reason for the confusion stems from the fact populist, like the word terrorist, is a 
label seldom claimed by people or organizations themselves, instead it is ascribed to them.  In 
the American and European media, the term has negative connotations.  It is often used  by 
mainstream politicians as a pejorative term to describe the opposition, much like Hillary Clinton 
calling Donald Trump supporters a “basket of deplorables…The racist, sexist, homophobic, 
xenophobic, Islamophobic - you name it” (Reilly, 2016).  Another image often associated with 
populism is one of far-right extremism; however, there are left-wing populists as well.  
Depending on political orientation, populist agendas can range from inclusive, egalitarian 
platforms to extreme chauvinism.  Some populist platforms have a combination of progressive 
and nationalist platforms, such as the Netherland’s Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, or 
PVV).  Led by Geert Wilder, a politician who is gay, the PVV’s platform includes anti-
immigration and anti-Islam elements, yet is pro-lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender, and 
women’s rights. 9  Occasionally centrist parties are categorized as populist, but, as will be 
explained later, they do not fit the typical populist model. 
Adding to the misperception, populism is frequently described as an ideology (e.g. a form 
of nationalism, fascism, etc.) but it is not.  Rather, it is a way of thinking about politics that taps 
into constituencies feeling marginalized by the political establishment.  Mudde and Kaltwasser  
(2017) depict populism as a thin-centered ideology that divides society into two homogeneous 
and antagonistic groups, the “pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and calls for politics to be 
                                                 
 
9Similarly, Germany’s Alternative for Deutschand (Alternative für Deutschland, or AfD) is led by Alice Weidel, 
who identifies as a lesbian. 
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an expression of the volonte generale (general will) of the people.  The “thinness” allows 
populists to easily adapt their narrative to the most current issues. 
The Structure of Populism 
Typical of all forms of populism are three core concepts: “the people,” “the elite,” and 
“the general will” (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017).  The “people” represents a shared common 
identity (this constitutes the “us” or ingroup), a social construct framed to appeal to multiple 
constituencies.  This identity combines socioeconomic and specific cultural traditions and values 
to form a vaguely defined “common” or “ordinary” people.  Representatives of this common 
identity are typically described as virtuous, righteous, hardworking, and gifted with common 
sense (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017).  This identity is used to mobilize voters against a 
perceived adversary (the “them” or outgroup), which can be internal to the country, external, or 
both.  However, the primary threat is represented by “the elite,” which can include the political 
establishment (state or supranational), cultural elites, and the media.  The elite are often 
characterized as being self-serving, corrupt, and “out of touch” or indifferent to the concerns of 
the “common person” (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017).  Lastly is the general will, which refers to 
the people joining together to protect their common interests (jobs, individual rights, social 
benefits, etc.).  While populism can lead to illiberal forms of government (as in the case in 
Eastern Europe), populist parties initially require a democratic electoral environment to be 
legitimized as acting in accordance with “the will of the people.” 
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A useful way of understanding these interactions is looking at the relationship of us and 
them from a horizontal and vertical perspective (see Figure 3-1).  The vertical axis represents the 
people and the elite.  The elite are always depicted as being on top.  The horizontal axis 
represents the relationship between insiders (the ingroup) and outsiders (the outgroup).  Another 
way of characterizing the relationship is those who share a way of life and those threatening that 
way of life.  Common threats are globalization, unrestricted trade, supranational institutions (e.g., 
United Nations, EU), religious extremism, etc.  However, the threats are not always external, 
there can be “internal outsiders” as well, those living within a state but not necessarily seen as 
belonging to the state, for instance ethnic diasporas or political adversaries.  Depending on the 
intersection of the various issues, populism can have a dyadic relationship (people vs elites) or a 
triadic relationship (people vs elites and outsiders). 
Defining Right-Wing populism 
Right-wing populism is always triadic in nature.  Based on a definition of “the people” as 
culturally homogenous, right-wing populists juxtapose their identity and interests with the 
identity and interests of “others,” usually minorities such as migrants, which in turn are 














Figure 3-1: Relationships in Right-wing Populist Constructs 
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process of “othering” involves identifying groups perceived to have lesser moral or ethical status 
than the people, this can include race, ethnicity, geographic origin, language, etc.  Related to this 
othering process, right-wing populists use highly negative forms of communications intended to 
go against formal and informal societal rules (e.g. emotional appeals, personal insults, a lack of 
political correctness, etc.).  In line with its anti-pluralist conception of the people, right-wing 
populists tend to demand radical solutions concerning their core interests.  Central to these 
radical solutions is the othering process, which also has a strong legitimizing effect on the use of 
indiscriminate violence (see Chapter 5). 
However, the concept of populism in itself is not a useful category when trying to 
measure the extent of the radicalism or extremism of a particular political party (Greven, 2016).  
Right-wing populists are not necessarily extremists, and right-wing extremists are not necessarily 
populists.  However, the latter is likely, as extremism lends itself to populism (Greven, 2016).  
The more ethno-centric the conception of the people, the more xenophobic the positioning 
against the other, and the clearer the desire to overthrow democratic governance, the more likely 
it is that a right-wing populist is also an extremist. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, right-wing populist parties are characterized as far right, 
radical right, and extreme right, with the terms often conflated.  Mudde’s (2018) categorization 
between extreme right and the radical right is crucial for understanding the right-wing populist 
dynamic.  The main European populist parties are best described as radical right-wing ideologies 
that are accepting of democracy, but want to oppose certain values, such as limiting minority 
rights and pluralism.  However, many of these groups have membership pulling from the 
extreme right.  For instance, Germany’s AfD, currently the third largest party in the Bundestag, 
draws from the same constituency as the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West 
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(Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlande, or Pegida), a German 
nationalist, anti-Islam, extreme far-right political movement.  However, it would be inaccurate to 
say Pegida is a branch of the AfD.  Rather, AfD tries to publicly downplay any association so as 
not to be linked to extreme-right activities.  Yet, it is important to note public displays do not 
necessarily reflect the private opinions of party members.  So, while AfD success offers the 
extreme right a politically effective voice, there are limitations that could create seams between 
the two.  The AfD has already had defections of extreme-right members.  Andre Poggenburg, 
one of the more extreme nationalist and xenophobic leaders within the AfD, left to form a more 
radical party, Uprising of German Patriots (Aufbruch deutscher Patrioten), to compete with the 
AfD (Jefferson, 2019).  Some see the fracturing of the right-wing populist parties as a positive 
sign; however, when considering the terrorist strategy of outbidding (see Chapter 2), the 
splintering of the most extreme elements of right-wing populist parties has a more ominous feel. 
Given the previous example, attempts to group all supporters of right-wing populist 
parties together is problematic as they tend to span the entire right-wing spectrum.  Zito and 
Todd (2018) identify similar problems with media depictions of Donald Trump voters as 
reflected in newspaper headlines.  Voters were economically distressed, uneducated, and angry 
(“Where were Trump’s Votes?  Where the Jobs Weren’t” – Eduardo Porter, New York Times, 
December 13, 2016).  Or, Trump was reliant on white voters without a college degree (“How 
Trump Won the Presidential Election: Revenge of the Working-Class Whites” – Jim Tankersley, 
Washington Post, November 9, 2016).  In short, voters are characterized as either incapable of 
making a reasoned decision or acting out of rage.   Zito and Todd’s analysis of Rust Belt Trump 
voters shows pre- and post-election depictions on Trump’s coalition often shortchange the 
complexity of the various subgroups’ motivations. 
35 
 
A more nuanced explanation requires considering both grievances and political 
opportunities.  Building on the idea of rational voters and rational political parties, the radical 
right phenomenon is best understood through the concepts of public “demand” and party 
“supply” (Norris, 2005). 
Drivers of Right-wing Populism 
Inglehart and Norris (2016) see voter attraction to right-wing populist parties grouped 
into three categories:  the demand-side of public opinion; the supply-side of party strategies; and 
the constitutional arrangements governing the electorate.  Of the three categories, the most 
common approach in earlier literature was on understanding how changes in the social structure 
fueled public demand for the radical right (Norris, 2005; Rydgren, 2007).  Demand side factors 
emphasize “bottom up” conditions (e. g., marginalized underclass, migration flows, long-term-
unemployment, cuts in the welfare state, mistrust of political parties/systems).  These conditions 
are considered “structural” in that they are understood as being persistent and enduring 
developments in society, which constrain the behavior of all political actors. 
A common theory related to the demand-side drivers is the economic insecurity thesis 
which emphasizes the consequences of the changes transforming the workforce and society.  
According to this view, rising economic insecurity and social deprivation among the “left-
behinds” fuel popular resentment.  Looking at evidence for the economic insecurity thesis, the 
results are mixed and inconsistent.  Right-wing parties do receive significantly greater support 
among the less well-off and among those with experience of unemployment, supporting the 
economic insecurity thesis (Inglehart and Norris, 2016).  But other measures do not consistently 
confirm this claim.  For example, in terms of occupational class, right-wing voting was strongest 
among the petty bourgeoisie, not unskilled manual workers (Inglehart and Norris, 2016).  
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Supporting this research, the more successful European parties have tended to rally a coalition of 
economically insecure lower middle-class citizens and skilled and unskilled manual workers, but 
this is not common across all parties.  Other groups are more dependent on a base of working-
class and poorly educated men. 
Another popular theory is the cultural backlash thesis which suggests the surge in votes 
for right-wing populist parties is not a purely economic phenomenon but in large part a reaction 
against progressive cultural change.  For right-wing populists, immigration is not simply a 
question of economic competition, it constitutes a threat against the presumed (constructed) 
identity of the people and their traditional values. Although the principle of othering, or “us vs. 
them” construct, is uniformly applied by all right-wing populists, the definition of the others 
varies based on nationally specific conditions.  For instance, in Hungary, one target is the Roma 
minority, while Islamophobia characterizes right-wing populists’ positions regarding the 
immigration (and integration) of Muslims elsewhere (Greven, 2016).  Based on the cultural 
backlash thesis, Inglehart and Norris (2016) found right-wing support in Europe is stronger 
among the older voters, men, the less educated, the religious, and ethnic majorities, indicating 
these groups are most likely to feel they have become “strangers in their own country” or left 
behind by progressive tides of cultural change.  All the cultural value scales proved consistent 
predictors of voting support for right parties.  Inglehart and Norris (2016) conclude that cultural 
values, combined with social and demographic factors, provide the most consistent explanation 
for voting support for right-wing parties.  However, other research suggests demand-side 
centered explanations alone are insufficient.  Grievances, like attitudes and preferences, are not 
easily directly translated into political outcomes.  Instead, they only become politically salient or 
powerful when mobilized and organized by politicians and parties (Berman, 2019). 
37 
 
Understanding populism also requires paying attention to the supply-side explanations 
which include the political program parties offer, their party organization, and political 
opportunity structures (such as electoral systems, elite responses, and the media).  Supply-side 
approaches focus on patterns of political competition, including where parties place themselves 
(e.g., left, center, right) across the ideological spectrum.  Based on the Theoretical Model of 
Party Competition (see Figure 3-2), rational voters choose the party closest to their ideological 
preference (Norris, 2005).  At the same time, mainstream political parties look to maximize their 
share of voters by adopting the ideological position closest to the median voter.  Thus, there is a 
tendency for mainstream political parties to converge to the center.  The distribution of public 
opinion across the ideological spectrum is assumed to follow a normal curve.  Within the 
ideological space there is a “zone of acquiescence” bracketed by party policy options on the far 
right and far left.  It is these peripheral areas where populist parties initially reside.  However,  
  
Figure 3-2: Theoretical Model of Party Competition (Norris, 2005) 
this zone is not static and public preferences on the demand side may shift as a response to a 
shock to the status quo (e.g., 2008 Global Financial crisis, 2015 European Migrant crisis, etc,) 
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(Norris, 2005).  With the convergence of mainstream political parties to the center, space is 
created on the borders to allow peripheral parties to enter the electoral marketspace. 
Not driven by a universal cause, right-wing populist parties are dependent on how their 
ideological narrative appeals work within the constraints set by the electoral system and the 
distribution of public opinion.  Under systems with low electoral thresholds10 right-wing populist 
parties can be successfully elected into parliament using rhetoric and ideological appeals (such as 
cultural protectionism) by targeting spaces outside the zone of acquiescence.  A determinant of 
populism’s success is also dependent on traditional parties’ policy profiles.  Right-wing populists 
tend to be more successful when center-left and center-right parties converge (Norris, 2005).  
Grand coalitions also seem to boost populist parties’ electoral fortunes. 
Growth of Right-wing Parties in Europe 
Partially a response to the number of deaths from Islamist terrorism, 2016 was a banner 
year for right-wing populist candidates who won several seats in national and European 
parliament elections.  This trend appeared to peak in 2016 with Marine Le Pen (France), Norbert 
Hofer (Austria), and Geert Wilders (Netherlands) making it to the final round of their respective 
presidential elections.  Their resulting defeat seemed to signal an end to the right-wing populist 
run.  However, right-wing populist parties are now found in the national governments of 22 of 
the 28 EU members and are either the ruling party or in a ruling coalition in five countries (see 
Appendix 2).  Rather than fading, right-wing populist parties represent a significant oppositional 
political force.  Populist gains reflect voters’ continued disenchantment with mainstream political 
parties, both at the state and EU level.  
                                                 
 
10 National-level representational thresholds across the EU tend to range from 3-5%, with some countries having no 
threshold for the European Parliament elections (Sabbatti, Sgueo, and Dobreva, 2019). 
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Given the parliamentary structure of European governments, these right-wing gains are 
significant as they are preventing mainstream political parties from achieving outright majorities, 
thus forcing the formation of less unified coalition governments.  In the 2017 German Federal 
Elections, the third-place finish of AfD caused a six-month delay in forming a government as 
mainstream parties negotiated forming a coalition without AfD participation.  Even when not the 
majority, right-wing populist parties are still impacting policy, as illustrated by the United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) orchestrating the 2016 Brexit referendum and the resulting 
“yes vote” on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. 
While frequently grouped together, all populist parties in Europe are not the same and 
have differing agendas (see Figure 3-3 for a sampling of right and left party agendas).  Returning 
to Brubaker’s horizontal-vertical approach, European populism can be placed into two broad 
categories of positioning between the people and the elite and between the inside and the outside.  
One category is the nationalistic populisms of Southern and Central Europe, and the UK.  
Another distinct cluster is the populists of Northern and Western Europe, especially those in the 
Figure 3-2: Major European Parties and Agendas (Ashkenas and Aisch, 2016) 
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Netherlands, France, Denmark, Belgium, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland.  This cluster is 
characterized as having a “civilizational” focus centered on a perceived threat from Islam.  
However, this identity is more complex than just race or religion.  “The preoccupation with 
Islam has given rise to an identarian ‘Christianism’, a secularist posture, a philosemitic stance, 
and an ostensibly liberal defense of gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of speech” 
(Brubaker, 2017, p. 1193).  Thus, the ability of populists to reach out to a broad constituency. 
Another difference between the two populist categories is the north-south division, which 
also represents a division in support for left-wing and right-wing populism.  The most popular 
groups in the southern tier (Spain’s Podemos, Greece’s Syriza, and Italy’s Five Star Movement 
(Movimento 5 Stelle, or M5S) are left-wing and primarily focused on EU induced austerity 
measures.  Immigration is not as central to these parties’ platforms.  Given these countries’ 
systemic economic problems, they are not as attractive to migrants.  The southern tier countries 
are primarily seen as an entry point to access the more prosperous countries in northern and 
western Europe, which correlates to better job opportunities and more robust social welfare 
programs.  Possibly indicating a change in the dynamic of populism in the southern tier, is the 
rise of right-wing groups in Spain (Vox) and Italy (League, or Lega). 
While much of the focus on populism (both right- and left-wing) is at the state-level, the 
number of seats won by populist candidates (of all types) in the European Parliament has also 
steadily increased.  Between 2009 and 2014, populists in the European Parliament grew by 50% 
accounting for 99 of 751 Members of the European Parliament, MEPs) (Dempsey, 2016).  After 
the 2019 European Parliament elections, populists (of all types) now account for 238 MEPs 
(32% of parliament) (Garcia and Whiteside, 2019).  Of this total, there are 163 right-wing 
populist MEPs.  The ramifications of this sizeable populist presence is hard to determine. 
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Despite their seemingly common agendas, the right-wing factions have struggled to work 
together in the past, but this could change.  Prior to the 2019 elections, far-right populist parties 
were divided among three groups in the European Parliament: the European Conservatives and 
Reformists (ECR) (included Poland’s Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PIS); the 
Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) (included Ital’s Lega) and France's National Rally 
(Rassemblement National, RN); and Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) 
(included UKIP).  In the run up to the 2019 elections, twenty different right-wing political 
groups and parties met to discuss forming a new right-wing coalition (Scholz, 2019).  The 
resulting coalition was to become the European Alliance of Peoples and Nations (EAPN) but this 
failed to come to fruition.  However, on 12 June 2019, it was announced the successor to the 
ENF would be named Identity and Democracy (ID) (Reuters, 2019).  ID has representation from 
nine EU member countries and accounts for 73 seats, making it the fifth-largest grouping in the 
European Parliament (Reuters, 2019).  ID consists of Lega (28 MEPs), RN (22 MEPs), AfD (11 
MEPs), Austria's (Freedom Party of Austria, (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) and 
Belgium's Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang, VB) (3 MEPs each), Finland's True Finns 
(Perussuomalaiset, PS) and Czech Republic's Freedom and Direct Democracy (Svoboda a Přímá 
Demokracie, SPD) (2 MEPs each), and Denmark's People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF) and 
Estonia's Conservative People's Party (Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond, EKRE) (1 MEP 
each) (Reuters, 2019).  Other right-wing populists in parliament include the UK’s Brexit Party 
and Spain's Vox accounting for another 29 MEPs (Reuters, 2019).  Even if the right-wing groups 
struggling to work together, individual they will still be a disruptive force within the EU 





Like the challenge of creating a universally accepted definition of terrorism, so is it with 
defining populism.  The lack of a common theory, history, political program, or social base 
prevents the establishment of a coherent set of criteria for explaining when and how political 
actors turn populist.  Since populists do not claim a defining text or ideology, academics and 
journalists use the term to describe a diverse range of political candidates and parties.  While 
there is a range of political actors with populist tendencies, the majority of populist parties and 
candidates are right-wing in nature. 
Some see populism as a temporary phenomenon; however, this may be more a case of 
wishful thinking.  As indicated by election results since 2016, right-wing parties are steadily 
becoming a significant oppositional political force at both the national and EU levels.  Right-
wing populist parties have established a foothold across Europe with representation in 22 
national governments and account for roughly 10 percent of the European Parliament.  There are 
no indications the right-wing populist trend in Europe is ending anytime soon.  In fact, in Spain, 
Vox won their first seats in the country’s parliament, the first time a far-right party has been in 
the legislature in 40 years (DW Staff, 2019, April 29). 
The support for right-wing populist parties and candidates reveals growing public 
discontent with contemporary economic and political agendas at both the national and EU levels.  
The literature shows public dissatisfaction is based on a wide variety of demand-side factors: 
economic anxiety, unemployment, immigration, inequality, weakening social welfare benefits, 
government spending (either too high or not enough), perceived government dishonesty, threats 
to national sovereignty, etc.  The enduring nature of these issues, some of which go back 
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decades, is what makes radical political parties increasingly attractive to voters, as these parties 
present an opportunity to change the political establishment blamed for today’s problems. 
The populist construct always sees the political problem from a weakened position, 
whether one feels left behind or that their way of life is under attack.  Populism in the most basic 
sense is another means of resistance by those who perceive themselves marginalized by the 
political system.  However, unlike terrorism, it is a means of using democratic elections to 
challenge the status quo. 
None of the leaders of the major right-wing populist parties have openly called for 
terrorist acts.  In fact, they tend to downplay violence.  An example of this is an exchange 
between Jordan Bardella, a politician for France’s RN, and a party supporter when discussing the 
EU, immigration, and terrorism at a local rally.  During a RN gathering a supporter yelled "Let's 
kill them.”  Bardella replied, “No, we're not going to kill them, but let's defeat them at the polls 
on May 26" (a reference to the 2019 EU elections) (Sandberg, 2019).  However, this example 
also highlights the fact there are individuals within these groups who are willing to use violence 
(or at least entertain the idea) to achieve their individual political objectives.  The concern is 
when do these individuals decide to take matters into their own hands, like in Christchurch, El 
Paso or Halle?  While right-wing populists do not currently represent a direct terrorist threat, 
they do pose an indirect threat based on their toxic rhetoric. 
Another concern is the splintering of more extreme elements from the populist parties.  
Given that splinter groups will have even more extreme political views, it is unlikely these 
factions can replicate the electoral success of the larger populist parties.  When considering the 
structural constraints of the Model of Party Competition, there is only limited space on the 
fringes to operate outside the Zone of Acquiescence.  Party fragmentation becomes more 
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concerning when taken into account with the terrorism strategy of outbidding (see Chapter 2). 
Splinter parties may see violence as the only way of convincing supporters they are the only ones 
capable of defending the people from the plethora of issues across the EU. 
The next chapter takes a more in depth look into the factors shaping the “us vs. them” 
narrative and the social and political issues which have created the opportunity for the expansion 




Chapter 4:  Identity and Othering in a European Context 
Today’s European identity was born from post-World War 2 necessities to create a 
unifying regional identity to suppress national identities to prevent a repeat of the conflict and to 
counter communist expansion.  Such an identity was a useful construct for the bi-polar Cold War 
world order.  However, the process of constructing this collective identity is conceptually no 
different than the one described in Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (2016).  
Anderson depicts imagined communities as a social construction invented by people who 
perceive themselves as part of that group.  Unfortunately, the idea of a European identity is more 
recent than many of the imagined nationalist identities it was meant to counter. 
Today’s European identity, based on the insecurities of World War 2 and the Cold War, 
is now being shaped by the uncertainties resulting from a globalized, multi-polar world.  One 
could argue the right-wing populist rise in Europe reflects cracks in the postwar narratives and a 
need for a new European narrative.  The current political situation within the EU allows one to 
see how right-wing populists are leveraging both old and new societal grievances to create 
nationalist appeals.  However, it would be shortsighted to put all the blame on populism.  While 
populist parties have successfully leveraged societal fears and uncertainty, they are not the 
source of the various issues.  In fact, it is the other way around.  The failure of previous 
administrations across the EU to address the underlying societal and political issues has fueled 
populism’s rise.  The rise of European right-wing populism should be seen as a warning sign of a 
pending political crisis.  Europe’s political and social issues provide a “perfect storm” creating 





Why Right-Wing Populism is So Popular in Europe 
The idea of Europeans working together and freely crossing one another’s borders (i.e., 
Zone) is being tested by a range of rapid developing and somewhat interrelated crises that 
undermine a pan-European identity.  The most significant of these threats is the increasing level 
of Euroscepticism among EU voters.  The main source of Euroscepticism among populists is the 
belief integration weakens national sovereignty and the nation state.  Others have lost confidence 
in the Euro since the 2008 global economic crisis.  Efforts to control the value of the Euro limit 
countries’ ability to use certain fiscal policies to manage budget and trade deficits.  Increasing 
Euroscepticism and decreasing confidence in the Euro is reflected in support for populist parties 
across the political spectrum.   
The multitude of issues European governments face are documented in several books, 
including:  Christopher Caldwell’s Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam, 
and the West (2009), Douglas Murray’s The Strange Death of Europe: Immigration, Identity, 
Islam (2017), William Drozdiak’s Fractured Continent:  Europe’s Crises and the Fate of the 
West, Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from 
Within (2006).  The wording in these titles (e.g., revolution, death, fractured, destroying) reflects 
the attitudes of voters susceptible to right-wing populist narratives.  If anything, right-wing 
populists are adept at rallying to the fears associated with the traditional concerns and can 
quickly refocus platforms to address the new concerns as they arise, such as the current Euro 
debt and refugee crises.  While the issue regarding immigrants from Muslim countries is not 
new, the 2015 crisis brought the issue of religion and identity to the forefront of right-wing 
agendas.   
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Although the fear of le grand remplacement resonates with many Europeans, this was not 
always the case.  There was a period during the post-World War 2 economic recovery when 
immigration was welcomed due to labor shortages.  But in the 1970s and 1980s, when European 
economic growth started slowing down, labor shortages started changing to labor surpluses 
(Murray, 2017).  Thus, the beginnings of anti-immigrant sentiments, but not necessarily with a 
religious component.  By the early 1990s, this discontent was beginning to show up in European 
polling (Judis, 2016).  Despite public concerns, many European leaders ignored or denigrated 
these sentiments.  Political “elite” condescendence, combined with economic stagnation, led to 
increasing public frustration with mainstream political parties.  This anti-establishment sentiment 
created opportunities for right-wing populist parties to gain entrance into the public sphere. 
Populists are more flexible with their platforms than mainstream parties, as their history 
is one of adaptability.  The first populist parties, such as France’s Front National (now RN) and 
Austria’s FPÖ, were petit-bourgeoisie parties focused on small business and anti-tax platforms 
(Judis, 2016).  By the 1990s, populist parties started expanding their base into the working-class 
constituencies formerly supported by the left (Social Democrats, Socialists, and Communists) 
(Judis, 2016).  With a new focus on immigration and economic policies, populist parties became 
workers’ parties.  Incorporating leftist agendas continues with right-wing groups now focusing 
on protecting and increasing social welfare programs to become people’s parties.  Right-wing 
populist adaptability is key to attracting voters from seemingly unrelated demographics. 
As already mentioned, frustrations with the EU and the Eurozone are key factors in the 
rise of European populism.  In establishing the EU, member states adopted a principle of 
freedom of movement for people and businesses (freedom of establishment) among its member 
states (Judis, 2016).  Populists see the policy of open borders as not only weakening a state’s 
48 
 
sovereignty and the ability to control immigration, but as a security vulnerability.  Although the 
EU’s economic and immigration policies are developed and reviewed by the member states, it is 
not always done in a way transparent to the average European citizen.  Thus, it is not just EU 
policies and euro-related austerity measures that are the source of discontent, but the belief the 
EU is making decisions not in the best interests of member states.  For example, the EP trying to 
impose immigrant quotas on all 28 members, some of which already have high unemployment 
rates (e.g., Greece, Italy, Spain) and no way to absorb additional refugees into their economies. 
Based on the above trends, the appeal of populism in Europe can be summed up in four 
ways.  First, populist supporters (the people) feel the important issues are not being addressed by 
the elites.  This ties issues like European integration and immigration, on which established 
mainstream parties (either at the state or EU levels) have been unwilling to campaign, to socio-
economic issues like economic stagnation, unemployment and welfare state reform.  Second, the 
elites are perceived as being all the same.  Governments with parliamentary coalitions have 
brought left and right mainstream parties closer to the center of the political spectrum.  Third, 
more and more people see state elites as essentially powerless and subservient to the EU.  
Finally, social media provides a favorable environment for political opposition compared to the 
past when established mainstream parties controlled the key mass media platforms.  The 
combination of these factors ensures a political environment allowing right-wing populist parties 
to flourish. 
Religion, Identity, and Religiosity in Europe 
The introduction of over 3.5 million asylum seekers (since 2015) from Muslim 
countries11  to an exceedingly secular region adds a unique aspect to European right-wing 
                                                 
 
11 Over 5.7 million refugees and asylum seekers documented since 2008 (Eurostat, 2018). 
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populism (Eurostat, 2018).  A byproduct of the issue is the emergence of competing Christian 
and Muslim identities, but not necessarily in the sense of religiosity of either migrants or host 
nations.  While none of the West European populist parties have a solely religious platform, 
religion still provides several points of contention.  The intersection of right-wing populism and 
religion has a significant shaping function on the immigration debate, which can be characterized 
as a clash of faith-based identities, civilizations, religiosity and secularism, or an amalgamation 
of all. 
Given the close correlation between right-wing populism and national identity, religion 
factors into the issues in different ways; however, to what extent religion plays a role is 
debatable.  According to a recent Pew Research Center study (2017, February), there are widely 
disparate views on the importance of religion to national identity in Europe.  For example, in 
Greece, 54% believe it is very important to be a Christian to be considered a true national (Pew 
Research Center, 2017, February).  In contrast, in Spain (57%) and Sweden (57%), the majorities 
say religion is not at all important to national identity (Pew Research Center, 2017 February).  
Regardless of the overall percentage, two important trends stick out.  First, people on the right of 
the ideological spectrum are more likely to view religion as very important to nationality (Pew 
Research Center, 2017, February).  Second, the importance of religion to nationality is often 
divided along generational lines.  People ages 50 and older are significantly more likely than 
those ages 18 to 34 to say being Christian is very important to national identity (Pew Research 
Center, 2017, February).  The age difference is partly explained by research from St Mary’s 
University showing most young people (16- to 29-year-olds) in several European countries do 
not follow a religion.  In twelve out of the twenty-one countries surveyed, over half of this 
demographic claimed not to identify with any religion or denomination (Bullivant, 2018). 
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Returning to Brubaker’s (2017) argument, this data tends to support the secular nature of 
“Christian Identitarianism.”  While there is some irony in the emergence of a Christian identity 
in what is considered one of the most secularized regions of the world, it is important to keep in 
mind that Christianity is not being embraced as a religion but as an identity opposed to an 
Islamic identity.  This may seem counterintuitive; however, as Brubaker points out, this allows 
Christianity to be privileged as a culture in a way that it cannot be privileged as a religion under 
secularist policies in the region, such as under France’s policy of  laïcité.  However, the level of 
religiosity associated with Christian Identitarianism may be understated. 
Another Pew Center survey (2017, May 10) looked at the way in which people connect 
(or do not) to religion in Central and Eastern Europe.  The three criteria used for determining 
religiosity was: belief in a higher power; participation in prayer and rituals; and belonging to a 
congregation, spiritual community or religious group (Pew Center, 2017 May 10).  The research 
suggests most religious practitioners around the world engage with religion in at least one of 
these ways, but not necessarily all three.  In Central and Eastern Europe, the Pew Research 
Center survey (2017, May 10) found religion was reasserting itself as an important part of 
individual and national identity.  Solid majorities of adults across much of the region say they 
believe in God, and most identify with a religion.  The comeback of religion in a region once 
dominated by atheist regimes is interesting.  Given this trend, it is reasonable to ask if a similar 
trend is occurring in secular Western Europe.  While the Pew Research study did not include 
Western Europe, it referenced a 1994 study by Grace Davie describing Christians in Great 
Britain as “believing without belonging,” supporting a belief religion can coexist with low 




A Clash Between Religiosity and Secularism 
This brings us to the first point of contention within the EU, one between religiosity and 
secularism.  Central to the discussion on immigration is how people integrate into host societies.  
Homegrown Islamist extremism and migrant-related violent crimes has fueled right-wing 
populist narratives that Muslim populations in Western Europe were not integrating into host 
countries.  Part of this debate involves a critique of multiculturalism, which some see as a failed 
policy.   Modood (2013) feels the greatest challenge to multiculturalism is what he characterizes 
as a “crisis of secularism.”  Modood sees Europe as transitioning from a secular to a post-secular 
society.  This post-secular society can be characterized as one between secularism and 
religiosity.  “Instead of treating religion as sub-rational and a matter of private concern only, 
religion is once again to be recognized as a legitimate basis of public engagement and political 
action” (Modood, 2013, p. 169).  Following along the reasoning of Modood, a key issue driving 
the “crisis of secularism” is the place of Muslim identities.  Paralleling the emergence of a 
Muslim identity, there is an emergence of a Christian identification in areas near large Muslim 
population concentrations.  Modood fears a radical secularist and Christian identity trend may 
combine in a form of cultural nationalism or “cultural Europeanism.”  Modood’s concerns are 
validated by Brubaker’s Christian Identitarianism argument.   Of course, based on social identity 
and realistic group conflict theory (see Chapter 5), when trying to elevate a minority group 
identity to a majority level, these trends are expected. 
However, the clash between secularism and religion may have as much to do with an 
internal struggle as an external one.  The data concerning the secularization of the younger 
European demographic does not tell the complete story about the religiosity amongst people 
identifying as followers.  A study conducted in the US shows there may be a correlation between 
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ethnicity, age, and religiosity.  Even as the US and Europe see a growth in atheism and 
agnosticism, Christianity and religious faith in general continue to rise in parts of the world that 
are not white.  In the US, people of color are more likely than whites to be Christians (Carter, 
2018).  They are also more likely to believe their faith is the place to find answers to questions 
about right and wrong (Carter, 2018).  Another noticeable trend, white Christians are aging, 
while Christians of color are “youthening” (Carter, 2018). 
 Given the connection between race, ethnicity, age, and faith it offers another explanation 
for the attraction of Islam to younger immigrants in Europe.  Religious identification provides a 
sense of righteousness and camaraderie.  In short, Islam, when shari’a law is factored in, 
provides a “total solution” for finding a meaningful identity lacking in places like the banlieues 
of Paris.   A parallel youthening of Christian and Muslim believers could add a new dimension to 
the “crisis of secularism” in Europe. 
Islam in Europe: A Threat to Christianity or Identity-Driven Paranoia? 
In all countries where the St Mary’s University survey was conducted, some affiliation 
with Christianity was identified, whether Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, or another form.  The 
countries with the largest percentage of Muslims are in Austria (10%), France (10%), Belgium 
(10%), Netherlands (8%), Switzerland (8%), and Germany (8%).  These numbers are interesting 
in that the largest Muslim populations are in the same countries where Brubaker (2017) 
identified the emergence of “Christian Identitarianism.”  Regardless, whether the populations are 
actively participating in religious activities, or are even religiously literate, religion is a clear 
marker between the “us” and “them.” 
Given the significance immigration plays in right-wing populist rhetoric, are these 
concerns of an increasing Muslim presence valid (i.e., le grand remplacement), or is this just 
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identity-driven paranoia?  There is certainly precedence for Europeans imagining an Islamist-
inspired threat, particularly given the rash of recent attacks inspired by ISIS.  Post-9/11 attempts 
to mobilize Muslim communities has created antagonisms and a stereotype of Muslims being 
associated with fanaticism and violence (Kepel, 2002).  This perception is partially illustrated in 
Manent’s (2016) book on radical secularism in France, particularly how he characterizes the 
nature of the Muslim presence.  Throughout the book Manent uses statements like: “those who 
now attack us” (p. 6); “a war against us has been declared and is happening” (p. 33); and “the 
French State is in a state of war both internally and externally” (p. 42).  While these statements 
are intended to serve as a call to action for addressing the issue of radical secularism, they still 
adequately capture the sentiment of right-wing populist parties and their supporters. 
A Clash of Civilizations? 
Brubaker’s (2017) civilizational argument parallels Samuel Huntington’s “clash of 
civilizations.”  Huntington (1993) argues with the “end of history” (a reference to Francis 
Fukuyama’s 1989 essay), the most important conflicts of the future will occur along the fault 
lines separating civilizations, particularly between Muslim and non-Muslim countries.   
Huntington defines a civilization as the “highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest 
level of cultural identity … defined both by common objective elements, such as language, a 
history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people” (1993, 
p. 24).  While Huntington’s argument is geared towards interstate conflict, it may hold true with 
the emergence of Muslim and Christian identities in Europe.  Modood (2013) points out the trend 
of Christian identification emerging in areas near large Muslim population concentrations.  Of 
course, central to the “clash of civilizations” argument is the idea of a common Muslim identity. 
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While “civilization” gives these arguments a primordial sense, the reality is more in line 
with Anderson’s (2016) concept of imagined communities, which is an imagined concept lying 
dormant until needed.  Arguably, the creation of an imagined global Muslim community requires 
both external and internal constructs to solidify its foundation.  In the case of right-wing 
populism, a rival construct is also a necessity. 
Returning to Huntington’s (1993) argument, he saw the world shrinking and the resulting 
interactions between people of different civilizations intensifying identity consciousness.  He 
also saw modernization and social change further separating people from their local identities 
and weakening the nation state as a source of identity, creating an opportunity for religion to fill 
the identity gap.  He described this as an “unsecularization” of the world, which allows religion 
to provide a basis for identity.  Huntington sees this form of identity being much stronger than 
national identities.  Along Huntington’s line of reasoning, a person can be half French and half 
Algerian, and simultaneously be a citizen of both countries.  However, it is more difficult, if not 
impossible, to be half Christian and half Muslim.  Huntington was making a faulty assumption 
that religious identity and religiosity were one in the same, as a result he underestimated the 
importance of national identity, and the possibility of Brubaker’s secularized Christian identity. 
The Return of Foreign Fighters 
While right-wing narratives and national threat estimates tend to focus on homegrown 
Islamist terrorism, another dimension of the “clash of civilizations” argument is the return of EU 
citizens who went to Syria and Iraq to fight for groups like ISIS and al-Qa’ida.  These 
individuals are often referred to as foreign fighters, or foreign terrorist fighters, and are defined 
as “individuals who travel to a State other than their State of residence or nationality for the 
purpose of the perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the 
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providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict” (CTC, 
2019).   In comparison, the number of HVEs are relatively small when compared to the number 
of foreign fighters.  In 2016, it was estimated of the approximately 15,000 foreign fighters in 
Syria and Iraq, between 3,922 and 4,294 originated from EU states (ICCT, 2016).  Of this total, 
2,838 foreign fighters come from four countries: Belgium, France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom, with Belgium having the highest per capita foreign fighter contingent (ICCT, 2016).  
It is estimated 14% of the EU foreign fighters were killed and around 30% have returned to their 
countries of departure.  There are concerns among EU members that the return of foreign fighters 
could result in another spike of HVE attacks (ICCT, 2016).  This is not an unfounded concern.  
Radicalized to an Islamist worldview, and in many cases having experienced armed combat or at 
least undergone some sort of military training, these returning foreign fighters add a new lethal 
dimension to an already disenfranchised community. 
As with trying to identify terrorists, there is no clear-cut profile of those who traveled 
abroad; however, there are two interesting findings on the role religion may or may have not 
played into their decisions to becoming violent extremists.  With regard to the place of residence 
before traveling, between 90% and 100% originate from large metropolitan areas or peripheral 
suburbs with many foreign fighters clustered around the same neighborhoods (ICCT, 2016).  
This would seem to indicate that acquaintance or friends radicalize as a group and decide to 
leave jointly for Syria/Iraq or recruit each other from abroad. Thus, initially group bonding or 
identity appears to have had a stronger effect than religious ideology.  As Belgian 
counterterrorism official Alain Grignard has noted, many foreign fighters in this generation 
appear to be Islamized radicals rather than radicalized Islamists (Heinke, 2017). 
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Another trend seen with foreign fighters is a large number had been the subject of 
criminal investigations prior to becoming radicalized.  For example, for foreign fighters  
originating in Germany, two-thirds had been the subject of criminal investigations prior to 
Islamist radicalization, with 62% linked to property crimes, 60% linked to violent attacks 
(assault, robbery, etc.), and  35% to drug trafficking (Heinke, 2017).  Politically motivated 
offenses made up only 4% of the crimes (Heinke, 2017).  More than 53% of the individuals with 
a criminal record were suspected of or were tried for three or more offenses, including nearly 
32% charged with six or more crimes (Heinke, 2017).  More than half of the departees were 
suspects in ongoing criminal investigations when they left (Heinke, 2017).   Thus, given the 
history of many foreign fighters, in addition to the possibility of a spike in HVE attacks, there is 
also the potential for a spike in criminal activity as these individuals return home.  Either of these 
outcomes would further fuel right-wing narratives.  However, there might be a completely 
different outcome.  Roy (2004), in discussing the internationalist commonalty between anti-
globalization movements and radical Islam said, “for a rebel, to convert is to find a cause” (p. 
49).  “Twenty years ago these men would have joined a radical leftist movement, but such 
movements have disappeared from the spaces of social exclusion…” (Roy, 2004, p. 48).  Instead 
of a renewed Islamist threat, the EU might face an entirely new threat. 
What Lies Ahead for Europe? 
Despite the EU’s best efforts to reduce nationalism, the rise of right-wing populist parties 
indicates national interests are making a comeback in European politics.  Denmark is a good 
example of this unexpected turn.  Considered one of the most open and egalitarian countries in 
the world, when it comes to immigration, Denmark is shifting to the right (Eakin, 2006).  There 
is a growing domestic consensus large-scale Muslim immigration is incompatible with European 
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social democracy (Eakin, 2016).  While Denmark has experienced its share of terrorism, what 
Danes are most concerned about is the threat Muslim immigrants pose to their way of life.  
Though Muslims make up less than 5% of the population, the perception is they fail to enter the 
workforce, are slow to learn Danish, and end up in high-crime immigrant neighborhoods where, 
while relying on extensive state handouts, they and their children are isolated from Danish 
society (Eakin, 2016). 
While the Danish government has started taking steps to appease public discontent over 
immigration, other countries are still finding it difficult to publicly discuss the topic.  France’s 
policy of laïcité leaves little room for serious discussion of religious identity in the public realm.  
When Muslim immigration is brought up by French populists, they are quickly silenced or 
labeled as Islamaphobes and fascists.  Yet, Muslims are equally frustrated by French secularism 
and feel just as marginalized.  Given Germany’s history with Judaism, Germans are also 
struggling to find an appropriate way to address immigration issues without being labeled a racist 
or a Nazi.  While there is an element of truth in these labels when placed on French and German 
far right-wing supporters, it nonetheless reflects the trend of mainstream politicians attacking the 
secondary symptoms of a problem rather than the primary problem (i.e., government policies 
related to immigration).  This trend further reinforces perceptions among right-wing populist 
supporters that government officials and mainstream politicians are ignoring their concerns.  
Public frustrations ensure a continued right-wing populist presence in European politics. 
Another trend in European politics is the “pull effect” of populism on the left and center 
political parties.  In Germany’s newly formed coalition parliament, the Christian Social Union 
(CSU), the sister party to Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union, is endorsing 
more conservative policy positions, particularly on immigration.  According to the CSU leader, 
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the rationale for doing this is to prevent “others” from occupying the space to the “right of 
center,” a clear reference to the AfD (Amann, Neukirch, and Pfister, 2018).  Similarly, French 
President Emmanuel Macron has taken a hardening stance toward radical Islam.  Macron’s 
centrist party is helping put into law government tactics applied before only as part of the state of 
emergency following the 2015 Paris attacks; a policy the FN (now RN) advocated for during the 
2016 elections (Nossiter, 2018).  In both the German and French cases, by forcing the center and 
center-right to shift to more conservative positions, the right-wing populist parties are indirectly 
achieving their goals. 
Interestingly, the opposite effect has occurred with left-wing populist parties such as 
Syriza (Greece) and Podemos (Spain) (Judis, 2016).  Instead of pulling mainstream parties 
towards them, they have moved towards the center and in the process their policies have become 
more mainstream.  This does not mean the issues launching them into government are resolved, 
it just means they are becoming more like the establishment.  Thus, public frustrations remain 
ready for exploitation by other populist parties.  The question then, at what point do the people 
forego mainstream and populist parties and decide to act on their own? 
Shaping mainstream polices is not the only influence of populism.  An unusual twist is 
past support for the FN (now the RN) among some French Muslims.  Given the FN’s strong anti-
immigration and anti-Islam platforms pose a direct threat to French Muslims, this is an 
unintuitive connection.  However, there is a ready-made connection between the two in the form 
of anti-Semitism.  Additionally, some Muslims reportedly voted for the FN as a rejection of 
Muslim extremists who have resisted integrating into French society (Kerkoud, 2012).  While 
“the enemies of my enemies are my friends” logic may be a factor in some cases, there may be 
more to it.  In structure, Islamic fundamentalism has the appearance of a right-wing populist 
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movement (exclusionary, critical of the elites, charismatic leaders, and a claimed will of the 
people).  For some Muslims, the populist narrative may be attractive.  After all, both have a 
similar theme of hatred, and both the populist voter and the radicalized Muslim feel abandoned. 
Chapter Conclusions 
In trying to understand the rise of right-wing populism in Europe, the challenge is 
defining what it means to be European.  The meaning of the term has frequently changed over 
time.  A common theme throughout European history is the most cohesive identities were 
influenced by external threats.  For early European inhabitants it was the rise of Islam providing 
them with a sense of identity through their spirituality.  The current European identity was born 
from post-World War 2 and Cold War necessities requiring collective forgetting of atrocities.  
This process is best summarized by Judt (2005) as “institutionalized public remembering,” which 
is the foundation of all collective identities.  Interestingly, this is echoed in Ernest Renan’s well 
quoted 1882 lecture “What is a Nation?” (Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?), where he claims, “the 
essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have 
forgotten many things.”  Renan believed that nations developed from the common needs of the 
people, who consisted of different social groups seeking a "collective identity."  Today’s 
challenge is the imagining of a unifying European identity is much newer than the national or 
ethnic identities it is intended to replace. 
Compounding the situation, past European insecurities have been replaced by new 
anxieties and fears related to globalization.  Right-wing populist parties are attempting to fill in 
cracks in the long-held postwar narrative.  Today’s generation did not experience these events 
firsthand, therefore it is easier for them to “un-forget” and attempt to create new narratives to 
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address today’s issues.  New narratives ensure the addition of new social cleavages, which in 
turn will increase anger and anxiety amongst certain demographics across Europe. 
Public dissatisfaction in Europe is based on a variety of long-standing concerns: 
economic anxiety, unemployment, immigration, inequality, weakening social welfare benefits, 
government spending (either too high or not enough), perceived government dishonesty, threats 
to national sovereignty, etc.  The enduring nature of these issues is what makes right-wing 
populism increasingly attractive to voters, as these parties represent an opportunity to change the 
political establishment largely blamed for the problems.  Right-wing populist parties are 
particularly successful in combining these issues to take advantage of fears related to migration, 
including loss of national/cultural identity and threats to public security (both criminal activity 
and terrorism).  While migration has an internal (EU vs non-EU) and external (non-European) 
component, the latter is one of the most heatedly debated, and racially charged topics in 
European politics. 
Could the societal conditions contributing to the rise of right-wing populism mark the 
beginning of a new wave of right-wing violent extremism?  Given the convergence of religion 
with a secular identity (e.g., Christian Identitarianism), it is not unfathomable for identity-driven 
politics to become even more confrontational.  Given the emergence of new identities and the 
return of foreign fighters, it could be that new forms of radicalization are moving into the 
“spaces of social exclusion” throughout Europe.  Returning to the issue of the 2016 Munich Mall 
shooting, although now characterized as motivated by right-wing extremism, it should be noted 
the perpetrator, David Ali Sonboly, was an 18-year-old Iranian German with dual nationality 




The next chapter explores the political mobilization and radicalization processes to 
determine how supporters of right-wing populist parties could transition from non-violent forms 




Chapter 5:  Political Mobilization, Radicalization and Othering 
As discussed in the previous chapters, there are a myriad of issues attracting people to 
support right-wing populist parties, some more salient than others.  Saliency can also vary across 
group members with some feeling more strongly than others about a particular issue.  While it is 
reasonable to assume some supporters of right-wing populist parties have extreme views, not all 
will conduct acts of political violence let alone become terrorists.  Nevertheless, given the 
number of mass causality incidents from around the world, this option may seem a viable course 
of action for some.  This chapter examines how individuals make the transition from non-violent 
political behavior to conducting acts of terrorism. 
The literature reveals a range of sociological and psychological theories explaining the 
radicalization process.  The various theories fall into two broad categories:  dispositional and 
situational.  The dispositional perspective implies there are internal determinates for extremist 
behavior and that certain individuals are predisposed to conduct acts of violence.  The 
situationist perspective argues the situation exerts the greater power over individual actions.  A 
similar means of categorizing the various theories is offered by the “syndrome” and “tool” 
perspectives.  As with the dispositional approach, the syndrome perspective focuses on internal 
psychological traits and suggests terrorism is “a kind of ‘disease’ with a definite etiology, 
developmental trajectory, and consequences” (Kruglanski and Fishman, 2006).  On the other 
hand, the “tool” perspective views terrorism as a means to an end, a tactic all can use 
(Kruglanski and Fishman, 2006).  Much like the situationist perspective, the tool perspective 






Conceptualizing Political Mobilization 
Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) use a “conveyor belt” analogy to conceptualize 
political mobilization.  Their model is useful for understanding the transition from passive 
support to more radical political behavior.  The conveyor belt represents a stage-theory 
interpretation of levels of political commitment, which is depicted as a pyramid (see Figure 5-1).  
The foundation of the structure is sympathizers who have a minimal level of commitment and 
may see party affiliation as part of their identity.  Next are those who justify radical actions but 
themselves are unwilling to physically take part in those acts.  This level of involvement can 
include both non-material and material support.  Next are those willing to take part in non-
violent action (demonstrations, protests) to support the cause.  At the apex are the most 
committed, the violent actors.  As the pyramid reflects, there is a proportional relationship from 
base to apex.  As radical beliefs, feelings, and behaviors increase in intensity the overall numbers 
having those sentiments decrease. 
Within this model, individuals are assumed to move toward violent behavior through 
ascending stages of radicalization; however, it does not require one to pass through each level 














sequentially or at a consistent rate.  An un-politicized individual can move from the base to the 
top quite rapidly by experiencing a life changing event.  While the conveyor belt provides an 
upward trajectory, it is not continuously in motion.  Much like any personal journey, individuals 
can choose to stop at various points along the route to reflect or speed ahead to its conclusion.  
Thus, there are supporters and activists who never become extremists, and there are extremists 
without a history of activism. 
Ideology can play a key role in radicalization as it provides a central guiding force 
throughout the process to assist those moving through the various stages (or to the next floor).  
Ideology also helps to structure individual thoughts during their conversion.  The supporting 
narrative is also crucial, as this helps to frame the actions of a group, or individual.  Both 
ideology and narrative are important in maintaining an individual’s commitment to extremist 
activities and group cohesion.  However, it is rare for individuals to commit acts of violence for 
purely ideological reasons (Moghaddam, 2006; Baran, 2008).  Personal frustrations, perceived 
injustices, and a multitude of other grievances can prompt individuals to reassess their current 
situation and be more receptive to alternative worldviews, particularly if there is a strong 
narrative supporting the ideology.  Rather, those who engage in militant activities usually do so 
for a combination of ideological and social reasons.  In fact, there is evidence to suggest many 
individuals move into radical circles after having already decided they want to engage in some 
form of confrontational politics indicting it is not necessarily the ideology that serves as the 
“radicalizing agent” but rather personal experiences (Mandaville, 2008).  Thus, personal 
frustrations, perceived social injustices, and other grievances can lead individuals to be more 




Conceptualizing Terrorist Organizations 
An issue when conceptualizing terrorist groups is assuming all members are equally 
radicalized or committed to conducting acts of violence.  As with non-violent political 
organizations, terrorist groups have differing levels of participation and commitment.  The 
Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (AIVD) uses a concentric ring model to 
depict the interaction between the various organizational elements (see Figure 4-2) (Akerboom, 
2003).  At the apex are those conducting violent acts, the “soldiers.”  The next ring represents the 
facilitators supporting operations (e.g., logisticians, financiers, etc.), followed by sympathizers. 
The outer right consists of the communities or societies from which group members originate.  
Like Moskalenko and McCauley’s (2009) model, the AVID model also reflects the relative 
proportionality of participation within each ring, with foot soldiers, or terrorists, representing 
only a small fraction.  
The ring structure is used to 
depict the radical intent of group 
members, with the most extreme at 
the top.  While sympathizers may 
only be minimally radicalized, and 
most of society not at all, as with 
political mobilization there are a 
variety of factors that can serve as 
agents to motivate individuals towards the center (an identity crisis, personal trauma, a lack of 
political alternatives, cause seeking, etc.). Given the similarities between the two models 





Figure 5-2: I  ing odel ( kerboo , 2003) 
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discussed, a reasonable question is if there is a common mindset for the those at the apex of 
Moskalenko and McCauley’s pyramid and the center ring of the AVID model? 
Is There a Terrorist Mindset? 
The research did not find any overwhelming evidence of a common terrorist mindset, or 
that specific personality traits can be used as a predictor for understanding why people become 
terrorists.  According to McCormick (2003), although some researchers suggest terrorists are 
abnormal in some ways, most observers believe terrorists are “disturbingly normal.”  Victoroff 
(2005) sees extremist behavior shaped by a combination of innate factors, biological factors, 
early development factors, personality, temperament, environmental influences, and group 
dynamics. Extremists are like everyone else, they are motivated by their own “psychosocial 
experiences and traits” (Victoroff, 2005).  Since there is no clear psychological answer to why a 
person becomes a terrorist, it is impossible to create a clear-cut terrorist profile.  Likewise, there 
is no universal profile for lone offenders, despite often being characterized as emotionally or 
cognitively impaired.  Research shows while they display elevated levels of negative emotions 
(namely anger, resentment, and vengeance), they can also have high-cognitive complexity 
(Baele, 2017).  While situational perspectives offer a better explanation why people become 
terrorists, there are still important unanswered questions.  Why are some people more susceptible 
to a given situation?  How do psychologically normal individuals decide violence is the best 
alternative?  While there is no psychological profile to determine who might become a terrorist, 
there does appear to be a common radicalization pathway, or pattern.   
The Radicalization Process 
Based on a study of disrupted western HVE plots, Silber and Bhatt (2007) developed a 
four-stage model to depict the radicalization process:  
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 Pre-radicalization: The period before an individual is exposed to an incident or 
episode making them receptive to an extremist ideology. 
 Self-identification:  Influenced by either internal or external factors, an individual 
begins to change their worldview and associate with like-minded individuals.   
 Indoctrination:  Individual fully adopts a political ideology and becomes willing to 
take action to further the cause.   
 “Jihadization”: Individual decides to take action and participates in the planning, 
preparation and execution of an act.   
All the individuals analyzed by Silber and Bhatt (2007) followed this sequential process.  
However, as with the earlier conveyor belt analogy, there is no guarantee all entering this process 
will follow through to the end.  Another key point is there is no timeline associated with this 
process.  The first three phases could take place over multiple years, or it could be a very rapid 
process, taking only a few months or weeks to run its course.  The NYPD findings were 
validated in a Danish Ministry of Justice report looking at homegrown radicalization in Europe.  
Precht (2007) uses basically the same model with slightly different labels for the phases (Pre-
radicalization, Conversion and Identification, Conviction and Indoctrination, and Action).  
Similarly, Moghaddam (2006) uses a staircase analogy to conceptualize the decision process a 
person uses in becoming a terrorist.  The stairway represents a narrowing passageway that as 
individuals progress, they see fewer options, until the final culminating point: 
 Ground Floor:   Equivalent to the pre-radicalization stage of the previous two models.  
What matters most is an individual’s feelings of deprivation, and perceptions of fairness 




 First Floor:  Equivalent to the conversion part of Precht’s second phase.  A person 
moves to this level in hopes of improving their living conditions, finding justice, and 
achieving a satisfactory identity. 
 Second Floor:  Equivalent to the identification phase of both models.  Unable to rectify 
their grievances, individuals become more receptive to messages identifying the causes 
of their problems.  A key aspect of this level involves the displacement of aggression, 
which creates an “us” versus “them” mentality. 
 Third Floor:  Equivalent to both the identification and conviction stages of Precht’s 
model.  This level involves the development of a belief structure that the individual is 
involved in a struggle to achieve the ideal society by any means possible.  This process 
not only provides them a “meaningful” identity, but also helps to build a morality 
supportive of the use of violence to further the cause. 
 Fourth Floor:  Equivalent to the indoctrination stage of both models.  Psychologically, 
the individual fully assumes the “terrorist” identity and is socialized into the terrorist 
organization. 
 Fifth Floor:  Equivalent to the “jihadization” and action phases.  A person is ready to 
commit a terrorist act (Moghaddam, 2006). 
While the models show what appears to be a common pathway towards radicalization 
and political mobilization, there is no single route to this process, instead there are many 
individualized routes.  The radicalization process seems largely influenced by the environment in 
which people live.  A consistent theme across the various models and motivational factors is 
individuals seeking a positive identity (individual or collective) and a just cause.  Based on the 
evidence, “group, organization and social psychology, with a particular emphasis on ‘collective 
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identity,’ provides the most constructive framework for understanding terrorist psychology and 
behavior” (Post, 2007). 
Sociological Theories 
A good starting point for understanding collective identity is Social Identity Theory.  
Henri Tajfel and John Turner’s (1970) work on intergroup conflict found when individuals see 
themselves in a situation where people can be categorized as an “us” (ingroup) and a “them” 
(outgroup), they will favor the ingroup and discriminate against the outgroup (Cottam et al., 
2016).  The populist nuance to this model is the people are always the ones being victimized, 
either by the elite or by outgroup gains.  Associated with Social Identity Theory is Fritz Heider’s 
(1958) attribution theory, which focuses on how people judge and evaluate others (Cottam et al., 
2016).  These attributes can lead to overly biased perceptions about outgroups.  For example, 
attributing outgroup behavior to dispositional causes rather than situational causes (fundamental 
attribution error); or using prejudices and existing beliefs to evaluate others (ultimate attribution 
error) (Cottam et al., 2016).  Attribution errors often result in exaggerated stereotypes, which in 
turn are incorporated into decision-making schemas, or cognitive structures used to organize 
information, experiences, attributes, etc.   
Alternatively, intergroup contact theory says exposing people to increased intergroup 
contact can help breakdown stereotypes (Cottam et al., 2016).  However, when looking at 
external issues such as immigration, it seems the opposite typically occurs.  Realistic conflict 
theory shows when perceived discrimination is a result of competition for limited resources, this 
will lead to even stronger negative perceptions of an outgroup (Cottam et al., 2016).  Finally, 
there is social causality, which during perceived crises, groups that people are associated with 
provide an ideological blue print for creating a “better world” and identifying the antagonists 
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who must be “defeated” to fulfill that vision (Cottam et al., 2016).  The latter theory partially 
helps explain how people can transition from non-violent political behavior to violent extremism. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the concept of othering helps to explain why certain forms of 
terrorism are more lethal than others.  Othering refers to the process of identifying groups 
perceived to have lesser moral or ethical status than members of a terrorist group.  This can 
include race, ethnicity, geographic origin, language, etc.  The significance of othering is it has a 
strong legitimizing effect on the use of indiscriminate violence.  If there is a clear dividing line or 
boundary between group members and others, there is no reason to discriminate when killing.  
Pushed by distinct types of differences, the confluence of ethnonationalism and religion 
(especially when tied to ethnicity) heightens the effect of othering (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008).  
As a result, the most lethal forms of terrorism are motivated by religion and ethnonationalism.  
Weaker forms of othering involve ideology (Leftist, Rightist), religion (without clear ethnic 
affiliation), environmentalism, anti-globalization, communism, and anarchism.  This 
phenomenon helps explain the difference in lethality of Islamist terrorism within Europe as 
opposed to the other variants.  
The Root Causes of Terrorism 
The idea of “root causes” of terrorism suggests there is some type of causal relationship 
between underlying social, economic, political, and demographic conditions and terrorist 
activity.  Along this line of reasoning, certain underlying conditions and grievances help explain 
how, where, and why terrorism occurs.  If terrorism is considered the dependent variable, then 
root causes form the independent variables.  However, Newman (2006) shows the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables is far more complex and one must also 
consider intervening and condition variables (see Figure 5-3).  Root causes can be further broken 
71 
 
down into permissive structural factors and individual grievances.  While premise structural 
factors create an enabling environment, alone they offer little explanatory value until combined 
with other variables.  For example, poverty alone does little to explain why someone becomes a 
terrorist; however, the combination of poverty and inequality, along with nationality, religion, 
culture, and/or ethnicity, tells a much different story.  The last component of Newman’s 
framework is intervening factors (leadership, funding, state sponsorship) that can serve as an 
essential catalyst.  When combined, the structural factors and underlying grievances provide a 
source of recruits, an ideology, and operational base.  The precipitant factors provide a political 







• Urban migrations 
• Population Growth 
• Burgeoning young age 
structure 
• Population density 
• Unemployment 
• Social change 
Dependent Variable 
• Terrorism  











• Sense of humiliation/alienation 
• Sense of foreign occupation/hegemony 
• Clash of identities/dispute with 
identity aspect 
• Violent conflict 
• Negative effects of globalization 
• Sudden economic downturns 
Figure 5-3: The Casual Relationship of the Root Causes of Terrorism (Newman, 2006) 
72 
 
The Role of Grievances 
Grievances, both actual and perceived, are considered one of the most important variables 
in the radicalization process (Ross, 1993).  According to Crenshaw (1981), the first condition 
that can be considered a direct cause of terrorism is the existence of concrete grievances among 
an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, such as an ethnic minority discriminated against 
by the majority.  Unaddressed grievances can lead to the development of a social movement, 
interest group, political party, or in extreme cases an individual, cell, or organization that 
engages in terrorist actions (Ross, 193; Crenshaw, 1981).  Presence of other forms of unrest, 
social, cultural, and political, can heighten the intensity of existing grievances.  Grievances 
leading to terrorism can be divided into seven categories: economic, ethnic, racial, legal, 
political, religious, and social (Ross, 1993).  Alternatively, in non-violent organizations, the 
intensification of grievances or lack of success in obtaining the group objectives may lead to 
organizational splits, and the development of elements more willing to engage in terrorism.  
The grievances leading to right-wing terrorism can be grouped into three categories: 
economic restructuring; societal changes challenging white male privilege; and political and 
public policy fueling resentment (Piazza, 2017).  Economic hardships are often linked to anti-
government and anti-status quo grievances advocated by the extreme right.  As a result, right-
wing hate crimes are more frequent in economically depressed communities because right-wing 
extremists seek to exact “revenge” against racial and ideological enemies they hold responsible 
for their economic difficulties (Piazza, 2017).  Another common motivation for violent right-
wing extremism is societal changes that have led to greater inclusion and empowerment of 
minorities (ethnic, racial, and religious) along with the general diversification of society.  These 
societal transformations are seen as displacing the traditional dominance of white, Christian 
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males, the demographic most predominately represented within right-wing extremist movements 
and right-wing terrorist organizations (Piazza, 2017).  The final motivation category involves 
perceptions of government and the mainstream political system. Right-wing extremists feel 
alienated from mainstream politics, deeply resent mainstream politicians, and believe they have 
no voice within government.  They justify their activities as moves to “patriotically” cleanse and 
renew the political system.  However, there is research showing when the political environment 
is controlled by politicians more aligned ideologically with right-wing extremists, terrorist 
activity may be exacerbated because extremists find the political environment more permissive 
and encouraging (Piazza, 2017). 
Right-Wing Terrorist Pathways in Europe 
While the grievances addressed above can be applied to many right-wing extremist 
groups, European terrorist pathways can also reflect a geographical component.  Similar to the 
north/south division identified by Brubaker (2017) with European populist parties, a similar 
divide exists amongst right-wing pathways to terrorism.  In the northern tier, Ravndal (2018) 
found grievances related to high ethnic diversity or immigration appear to be most pronounced in 
countries lacking influential anti-immigration (radical right) parties during the period 1990–
2015, thereby creating mobilization opportunities for the extreme right.  Right-wing mobilization 
may also have been fueled by previous public repression and stigmatization of radical right 
actors and opinions in countries like Sweden, Germany and the UK (Ravndal, 2018).  While 
repression and stigmatization may have discouraged some from joining radical and extreme right 
groups, they may have also pushed the most ardent supporters into more clandestine and 
revolutionary paths, which can lead to embracing terrorism (Ravndal, 2018). 
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In the southern tier, the pathway involves a combination of socioeconomic hardship, 
authoritarian legacies, and left-wing militancy (Ravndal, 2018).  However, the legacies of former 
authoritarian regimes create opportunities for radical behavior on both sides of the political 
spectrum, intensifying an already polarized left-right divide.  Once a sufficient number of 
radicals have been mobilized on both sides, a reciprocal spiral of violence and terrorism is likely 
to follow, as illustrated in Italy and Spain where a majority of right-wing attacks targeted left-
wing militants as opposed to the northern countries where immigrants constitute the largest 
target group (Ravndal, 2018).  The left-right political cleavage in this region may also be related 
to Italy, Spain and Greece still having active communist parties.  However, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, with Antifa this cleavage seems to be spreading both in Europe and the US. 
However, as already discussed with the radicalization process, these pathways do not 
guarantee any particular grievance by itself will automatically lead to terrorism.  Instead, a 
highly polarized environment between far-right activists and their enemies, including (leftists, 
political elites, ethnic groups, etc.), represents a necessary condition for extreme levels of 
violence (Ravndal, 2018).  From a social movement theory perspective, the extent of polarization 
may be a key factor determining whether the final outcome is non-violent, or if terrorism is 
likely to occur.  The increased presence of the right-wing populist parties seems to serve as an 
accelerant to the polarization of politics in Europe and abroad. 
Chapter Conclusions 
An overarching theme connecting right-wing populists and right-wing terrorists is a 
“revolution” against the perceived status quo to create a new social order or return to a lost 
golden age.  This belief makes it easy for these groups to divide the world into us and others.  
Although right-wing populist parties have refrained from advocating for violence and sometimes 
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publicly distance themselves from the extreme right, the rhetoric addressing the perceived 
grievances has fostered increased resentment.  As indicated by the research, just the presence of 
the groups in government may serve to embolden right-wing extremist behavior because they see 
the political environment more permissive and encouraging.  Yet, while many people share 
similar grievances and experiences, proportionally few become terrorists. 
While there is no psychological profile to decide who might become a terrorist, there are 
several models to help explain how an individual becomes radicalized.  Through these models, 
one can find common elements playing into the radicalization process such as a sense of 
alienation, feelings of marginalization, political oppression, discrimination, poverty, and a desire 
to do something important.  Arguably, these are the very same grievances of right-wing populist 
party supporters. But again, this does not explain why all individuals exposed to similar 
situations and experiences are not prone to becoming a terrorist.  No single factor seems 
necessary in leading someone down the path of terrorism (Precht, 2007).  Rather, radicalization 
is the product of a combination of individual motivational factors. 
The grievances leading to right-wing terrorism can be further grouped into three general 
categories: economic restructuring; societal changes challenging white male privilege; and 
political and public policy fueling resentment.  For right-wing extremists in Europe, geography 
also appears to be the key intervening variable.  Following along the lines of Brubaker’s (2017) 
civilization identarian split, right-wing pathways also have a north/south split.  The northern 
pathway involves the combination of high immigration, low electoral support for anti-
immigration (radical right) parties, and public repression of radical right actors and opinions.  
However, the southern pathway opens up a new threat vector that is not one of the typical 
grievances related to right-wing populism; confrontation with left-wing militants. These 
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pathways do not guarantee terrorism, which requires a combination of grievances, opportunities, 
and increased polarization. 
Radicalization takes place in the social climate in which people live.  This is normally 
assumed to mean physical locations; however, as discussed in Chapter 2, the internet has 
broadened the space where radicalization can take place.  Whether an Islamist or a white 
supremacist, individuals can become further radicalized because of what they watch or read 
online.  The internet and social media allow terrorists unprecedented ways to network globally 
and the ability to propagate their ideologies and their grievances. 
Regardless of how the message is received, the key component of intergroup conflict is 
how people are categorized within an ingroup (us) and an outgroup (them) construct.  The 
significance of othering is it has a strong legitimizing effect on levels of violence.  The effect of 
othering is demonstrated in past mass casualty attacks by both Islamists and right-wing domestic 
terrorists.  The increasingly toxic narrative of the radical right only serves to intensify the 
othering dynamic amongst this demographic. 
The concluding chapter looks at the implications of the rise of right-wing populism on 
domestic terrorism in the EU.  Specifically, how might the presence of right-wing populist 




Chapter 6:  Implications for Domestic Terrorism in the EU 
Many see the increasing presence of right-wing populist parties in local, national, and EU 
parliaments as a concerning trend.  Others see right-wing populism as a temporary aberration 
limited by electorate demographics (Inglehart and Norris, 2016).  However, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, the current European parliamentary environment is structurally conducive to the 
spread of right-wing populism.  Low representational thresholds (3-5% at state and EU levels) 
provide an opportunity for right-wing populist parties, or any radical party, to enter their 
respective parliaments.  With representation in 22 national governments and in the European 
Parliament, it does not appear right-wing populism is going away any time soon.  Right-wing 
populist gains reflect growing public discontent with mainstream political parties and their 
policies and agendas, at both the national and EU levels.  Even if the public sentiment across the 
EU starts to turn against populism, a populist presence is ensured at least through the next round 
of national (term limits across the EU varies between 4-5 years) and EU Parliamentary elections 
(next election 2023).  However, given the low representational thresholds it would likely take 
more than one election cycle to reverse the current right-wing populist wave. 
While no right-wing populist parties have openly called for violence within the EU, their 
othering narratives have nonetheless served to inspire lone actor right-wing extremists to commit 
acts of violence.  Thus, the question remains, what are the implications of the rise of right-wing 
populism on domestic terrorism in the EU?  More specifically, in what ways might the presence 
of right-wing populist parties in government (either national or EU) affect domestic terrorism in 
the EU?  Based on the previous chapters, there are seven hypotheses to consider: 
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 Hypothesis 1: Right-wing populist electoral gains, in either the national or EU 
parliaments, inspires far-right extremists, regardless of party or group affiliation, to 
conduct domestic terrorism. 
 Hypothesis 2: Right-wing populist electoral gains, in either the national or EU 
parliaments, has no effect on current levels of organized right-wing domestic 
terrorism (as reflected in the EUROPOL TE-SATs). 
 Hypothesis 3: Mainstream political parties or coalitions’ attempts to marginalize or 
reverse right-wing populist electoral gains leads to right-wing parties changing their 
stance on actively advocating for violence. 
 Hypothesis 4: Mainstream political parties or coalitions attempts to marginalize or 
reverse right-wing populist electoral leads to extreme right-wing cells splintering 
from parent organizations and choosing domestic terrorism as a course of action. 
 Hypothesis 5: Changes in right-wing populist party agendas pulling them towards the 
political center leads to extreme right-wing cells splintering from parent organizations 
and choosing domestic terrorism as a course of action. 
 Hypothesis 6: An increase in extreme right-wing violence leads to a corresponding 
increase in left-wing violence. 
 Hypothesis 7: A resurgence of Islamist-inspired homegrown terrorism leads to an 
increase in right-wing domestic terrorism. 
Hypothesis 1: Right-wing populist electoral gains, in either the national or EU parliaments, 




Right-wing narratives have already emboldened a few lone actor extremists, all outside 
the party structure, to conduct terrorist attacks.  But is this a case of a few “one offs” or are these 
incidents indicative of a larger trend?  If the latter is true, what could help explain this?  One 
explanation is extremists might interpret the presence of right-wing populists as a public 
endorsement or validation of their beliefs.  Additionally, given the sizable electoral gains 
(ranging from 3-49%), right-wing extremists may perceive the political environment as more 
accepting of far-right views.  Based on these two explanations, right-wing extremists may 
perceive the current security environment as more permissive.  Lastly, it could be the same 
democratic system that allows populist participation makes it vulnerable to terrorism.  The latter 
is supported by the democratic vulnerability theory of terrorism. 
According to democratic vulnerability theory, political and civil liberties are positively 
correlated with terrorism because of the permissiveness of democratic systems (Chenowith, 2010).  
According to Piazza (2006) and Li (2005), terrorism is more frequent in democratic societies due 
to easier communication and dissemination of ideology.  Also, terrorist events are more likely to 
be reported in democratic countries.  Access to free press is arguably more important than 
freedom of movement when considering terrorism as a means of communication, recruitment, or 
mobilization. 
Linking democratic vulnerability to populism is social cleavage theory, which posits a 
large number of political parties in the legislature (more than two or three) usually signifies deep 
social divisions in the electorate that contribute to government fragility and general political 
disorder.  Specifically, countries with multiparty systems are plagued by frequent elections, 
unmanageable governing coalitions, extremist or ‘‘anti-system’’ parties, and government policies 
that are the result of complex compromises in party coalitions.  Multiparty systems, therefore, 
are ‘‘weaker’’ than two- and three-party systems and are also more prone to political violence. 
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Hypothesis 2: Right-wing populist electoral gains, in either the national or EU parliaments, 
has no effect on current levels of organized right-wing domestic terrorism (as reflected in 
the EUROPOL TE-SATs). 
One cannot assume an increased presence of radical right-wing populist parties in 
government, either at the state or EU levels, will automatically lead to an increase in right-wing 
domestic terrorism.  In theory, it could have the opposite effect.  According to political access 
theory, democracies reduce prospects for terrorism because they offer avenues for citizens to air their 
grievances (Chenowith, 2010).  Because of the increased opportunity to express grievances, individuals 
and groups are more receptive to pursuing non-violent alternatives.  The radical right-wing populist 
parties in the EU with representation in state or EU parliaments are by definition accepting of 
democracy as a means of obtaining their political objectives (see Chapter 1).  Based on political 
access theory, if radical right-wing populist parties are allowed to participate in democratic 
elections, they are unlikely to change their stance on using terrorism.   
Political access theory may partially explain the low numbers of right-wing inspired 
domestic terrorism reported in the EUROPOL TE-SATs.  Taken into account with the Model of 
Party Competition, it also helps explain why right-wing populist parties are not openly calling 
for violence.  The area outside the Zone of Acquiescence from where these parties originated 
only offers limited votes.  For right-wing populist parties to expand their support base, they must 
attract voters in the Zone of Acquiescence.  Seeking a course of action incorporating domestic 
terrorism would have the opposite effect.  Thus, based on political access theory, if right-wing 
populist parties gain or maintain seats in either national or EU parliaments, right-wing terrorism 
should remain at current levels or possibly decrease.  
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Hypothesis 3: Mainstream political parties or coalitions’ attempts to marginalize or reverse 
right-wing populist electoral gains leads to right-wing parties changing their stance on 
actively advocating for violence. 
However, political access in itself does not entirely reduce prospects for domestic 
terrorism.  Although right-wing populist parties have found some success at the state and EU 
parliamentary levels, it does not mean their political views will be embraced by mainstream 
political parties.  While there are instances of mainstream parties adapting certain aspects of 
right-wing agendas in an attempt to regain lost voters (e.g., changing positions on immigration 
quotas), mainstream political parties have mainly moved to counter right-wing electoral gains 
(see Chapter 4).  For instance, in Germany, an AfD candidate (party controls 92 of the 709 seats) 
has been blocked six times from becoming a deputy parliamentary speaker, despite the tradition 
each party provides a deputy (DW Staff, 2019 April 4a).  If mainstream political parties succeed 
in forming alliances/coalitions to marginalize/block right-wing populist gains, frustration among 
populist parties may lead them to re-evaluate their position on openly calling for violence.  
Chenowith (2010) found support for the hypothesis that intergroup competition, motivated by the 
competition within the political environment, can explain an increase in domestic terrorism.  
Chenowith (2010) also found a positive relationship between political competition and the 
number of terrorist groups emerging within a state and a positive relationship between the 
density of domestic interest group participation and terrorist activity. 
While the possibility exists that right-wing frustration could lead to more extreme 
actions, given the current electoral trends at both the national and European Parliament levels, it 
seems unlikely right-wing populist parties would risk losing their newly acquired foothold in the 
Zone of Acquiescence.  Despite the political maneuverings of mainstream parties, at this time 
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there are no indications the right-wing populist parties are willing to change their stance on 
advocating for terrorism, or other acts of political violence.  As with the earlier Rassemblement 
National example from Chapter 3, in this case it makes more sense to “defeat them at the polls” 
than to kill them.  In fact, oppositional maneuvers to counter populist gains may actually 
reinforce populist anti-elite narratives, helping to attract more public support. 
Hypothesis 4: Mainstream political parties or coalitions’ attempts to marginalize or reverse 
right-wing populist electoral leads to extreme right-wing cells splintering from parent 
organizations and choosing domestic terrorism as a course of action. 
A variation of Hypothesis 2 is that individual frustration over political obstacles results in 
the more radicalized supporters, or factions, splitting from the populist parties.  Moskalenko and 
McCauley’s (2009) model of political mobilization shows there is a range of commitment and 
radical behaviors within political parties.  Within their pyramidal model, there already exists a 
small proportion of party members willing to commit acts of violence.  Based on the sociological 
theories discussed in Chapter 5, it is assumed party identity/participation helps moderate these 
inherent extremist tendencies.  However, if members feel their needs are not being fulfilled or 
protected by the group, this could lead them to seek other alternatives.  This fragmentation could 
lead to radicalized cells or lone actors deciding to use terrorism to achieve their political 
objectives (e.g., Christchurch).  For those already feeling marginalized by the political system, it 
may seem reasonable to turn from one “weapon of the weak” (populism) to another (terrorism) 
to address their grievances.  
Hypothesis 5: Changes in right-wing populist party agendas pulling them towards the 
political center leads to extreme right-wing cells splintering from parent organizations and 
choosing domestic terrorism as a course of action. 
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Frustration over the actions of mainstream political parties may not be the only reason for 
populist parties splintering.  According to the Political Competition Model, to maximize electoral 
support, political parties and candidates eventually migrate towards the largest concentration of 
voters.  In trying to expand voter base, populist parties will need to adapt to a broader range of 
interests at the expense of their most extreme polices.  Similarly, for those populist parties 
currently participating or seeking to participate in coalition governments, they will likely have to 
make some compromises or moderate their polices.  Such compromises will likely lead to a 
disconnect amongst hardline party elements.  Disillusioned supporters may decide the only 
acceptable option for changing the distribution of power or demonstrating political resolve is to 
resort to terrorism.  As discussed in Chapter 2, the terrorism strategy of outbidding is intended to 
show the public that the extreme factions have greater resolve to fight the enemy than rival 
political groups, and therefore are worthy of public support.   
Hypothesis 6: An increase in extreme right-wing violence leads to a corresponding increase 
in left-wing violence. 
This hypothesis builds on the north/south differences in right-wing pathways to terrorism 
discussed in Chapter 5.  As demonstrated in the southern tier of the EU, the right-wing gains in 
governments has led to a spiral of increasing violence and terrorism between right- and left-wing 
extremists.  The southern-tier conflict may be unique to the geographical differences in the 
underlying political and social issues; however, similar sentiments contributing to the increased 
presence of groups like Antifa (see Chapter 2) seems to reveal a much broader geographical 
diffusion.  A 2018 YouGov poll of Democrat and Republican supporters conducted in the US 
found 38% of Democrats and 40% of Republicans believe those who identify with the other 
party are threats to their way of life, compared to 25% and 21% in 2017, respectively 
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(Frankovic, 2018).  While these responses may be a reflection of the emotions associated with 
the current polarization in American politics, the threat perception is not totally unfounded.  As 
discussed earlier, groups like Antifa are increasingly seeing violence as a means of responding 
to the far right.  
Hypothesis 7: A resurgence of Islamist-inspired homegrown terrorism leads to an increase 
in right-wing domestic terrorism. 
Similar to the right/left spiral, is the potential for a right-wing/Islamist spiral. Given the 
return of foreign fighters to EU countries of origin, it would not be surprising for the current 
decline in Islamist inspired terrorism to reverse.  For those returning, it is hard to imagine the 
drivers that convinced them to go to Syria and Iraq have diminished in any way and in the 
countries where right-wing populism has emerged, the environment could arguably be worse.  
This combination could serve as a source of motivation to bring the war back to Europe. 
Unfortunately, the EU polices related to open and uncontrolled borders, mismanagement of the 
immigration crisis, and a lack of the information sharing between EU countries that contributed 
to the success of previous attacks in France, Belgium, and the UK still remain.  For this reason, 
Europe is likely to continue experiencing homegrown terrorism at current or higher levels.  The 
latter would have significant consequences for right-wing populism and right-wing terrorism. 
Immigration and terrorism are already key components of the right-wing populist 
narrative, any change for the worse would reinforce populist claims and increase public support 
for these parties, both of which would likely embolden populists to seek more radical policies.  
Based on the spiraling logic of Hypothesis 6, a resurgence in Islamist-inspired homegrown 
terrorism could lead to a corresponding increase in right-wing attacks.  There is some precedence 
for this occurring after previous Islamist attacks in Europe.   Following the 2005 London 
85 
 
bombings, there was a 600 percent increase in the rate of right-wing violence against Muslims in 
the UK and following the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks, similar incidents rose by 281 percent in 
France (Koehler, 2016) 
Theoretical Wild Card: What if Emphasis on Right-Wing Populism is Misplaced? 
While the focus of this thesis is on the influence of right-wing populism on domestic 
terrorism, the emphasis on political parties as a source of inspiration could be misplaced.  An 
interesting development that may indicate the evolution of the populist trend in Europe is the 
French anti-establishment grassroot movement known as the Mouvement des gilets jaunes 
(Yellow Vest Movement) which started as an online petition against an increase in the country’s 
fuel tax and quickly grew to a series of protests against the French government.  At the high 
point of the movement, up to 280,000 protestors were involved across the country (BBC Staff, 
2018).    The movement was concerning enough that President Macron conceded to conduct a 
national debate aimed at encouraging ordinary people to propose changes to France's economy 
and democracy.  Some see this as a win for direct democracy in which people interact with the 
country’s leadership to decide policy initiatives, as opposed to a representative democracy in 
which people vote for representatives who then decide policy initiatives.  
What makes the Yellow Vest revolt so different is it did not follow the usual populist 
playbook.  The movement has kept its distance from both the far right and left, allowing it to 
attract membership from across the political spectrum.  This has allowed the movement to bring 
people together from vastly different ages, social classes, occupations, and views (Rose and 
Baker, 2018).  In many ways the movement represents a form of leaderless resistance (see 
Chapter 2). With no centralized leadership or structure, the Yellow Vest movement is the 
epitome of the “anti-elite” movement, almost to a fault.  Members are broadly opposed to 
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decision making authority and attempts by individuals within the movement to bring order often 
faced internal resistance which some see as the inherent weakness of such a movement (Rose 
and Baker, 2018). Unfortunately, without a centralized leadership to restrain group actions, there 
is a risk of small cells or lone actors conducting terrorist acts. 
A variation of the Yellow Vest movement, but on a vastly smaller scale (hundreds as 
opposed to thousands of protestors), is a group calling themselves the “Black Vests.”  This group 
consists of hundreds of undocumented workers primarily from West Africa (BBC, 2019, July 
12).  Group members describe themselves as "the voiceless and the faceless of the French 
Republic" (BBC, 2019, July 12).  Like the Yellow Vest protestors, they are also looking for 
direct interaction with the government.  While it is unlikely this movement will be as successful 
as the Yellow Vest movement, the willingness of groups to seek to direct interaction with their 
governments seems to be steadily increasing, even in some unlikely locations.  The 2019 
demonstrations in Hong Kong also had several similarities to the Yellow Vest Movement. 
What do all three movements have in common?  All reflect public anger with the status 
quo and distrust of organized politics.  Given the ability of these self-organizing movements to 
rapidly mobilize across traditional boundaries in the age of social media, one has to wonder if 
this might become the new norm of contentious/confrontational politics, much like how lone 
actors and HVEs have changed how terrorism is understood. 
Limitations and Areas for Future Research 
In exploring the relationship between right-wing populism and domestic terrorism, two 
data shortfalls standout.  In his study of right-wing violence, Ravndal (2019) found mainstream 
media outlets rely on incomplete data drawn from data sets suffering from critical shortcomings. 
Media reporting often relies on two well-known terrorism databases, the Global Terrorism 
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Database (GTD) and EUROPOLS’s TE-SAT (used for this thesis), which Ravndal (2019) argues 
are “poorly equipped” to capture right-wing terrorism and violence.   According to Ravndal 
(2019), GTD does not code for the perpetrator’s ideological motivation and only includes a 
fraction of right-wing attacks registered in other data sets.  As previously discussed, 
EUROPOL’s TE-SAT data relies on EU states’ own reporting based on different legal 
definitions of terrorism.  What is defined as domestic terrorism in one country may be considered 
a hate crime in another.  Given the definition limitations in these commonly used sources, there 
is a possibility the numbers of related incidents are underreported and right-wing terrorism is 
inaccurately portrayed compared to other types.  Ravndal (2019) argues there needs to be a new 
means of distinguishing right-wing attacks from other types of violence, such as apolitical crimes 
(e.g. armed robbery) committed by members of far-right groups.  Additionally, Ravandal (2019 
believes there needs to be some kind of systematic measurement displaying reliable patterns of 
change over time.  Based on the research for this thesis, the same argument could be said of how 
left-wing terrorism is measured. 
At the root of the measurement problem identified by Ravndal is the issue of how 
terrorism is defined and conceptualized.  Past definitions tend to focus on what could be 
considered traditional terrorist groups, whereas the current terrorist threat to the EU is 
increasingly becoming more individualized, whether it be domestic or homegrown variants.  
While inspired by different ideologies, the commonality between the two is the membership 
consists of socially alienated individuals.  While academia already has hundreds of definitions of 
terrorism, it could be these efforts to define or label certain forms of public protest as terrorism 
(or populism for that matter) takes away from why these individuals are alienated in the first 
place.  Rather than focusing on a specific act, the research focus should take a broader look at the 
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entire spectrum of “weapons of the of weak.”  Such an approach would help to better understand 
the inherent similarities and linkages between political mobilization, radicalization, and the most 
extreme product of the two, terrorism. 
Concluding Thoughts 
The narratives promoted by right-wing populist parties have served to radicalize those 
with extreme right-wing views.  Events like Christchurch and El Paso appear to be following an 
eerily similar trajectory to that of lone actors and HVEs inspired by al-Qa-ida and ISIS.  The 
similarities should not be a complete surprise.  Religious fundamentalism tends to uphold a 
belief in strict, literal interpretations of guiding documents, has a strong othering effect, and is 
strongly opposed to change.  Similarly, far-right extremism has a strong othering effect and is 
strongly opposed to change.  Given these similarities, it could be how governments label the two 
is preventing them from seeing the terrorism issue in its entirety, as with the current disconnect 
between the number of instances and lethality of terrorist attacks across the EU.  When looking 
at the radicalization process and pathways, the issues contributing to terrorism (transnational, 
domestic, or homegrown) are ubiquitous.  
Pankaj Mishra, in his book Age Anger:  A history of the Present (2017), contributes 
today’s contentious global political and social environment as a response to the globalization and 
the normalization of Western ideals such as individualism, capitalism, and secularism.  There is 
no doubt these factors have fueled the emergence of nationalist, isolationist, and fundamentalist 
sentiments, but they are not the sole explanation for individuals willing to use violence to address 
their fears, frustrations, and transgressions of others (real or perceived).  
Right-wing populism and domestic terrorism represent two forms of protest against the 
status quo.  While there is currently no direct linkage between the two, there is an indirect one.  
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There is no doubt some supporters of radical-right populist parties have extreme right views.  
There are certainly some supporters willing to use violence to achieve their political objectives; 
however, it should not be construed all group members do.  None of the leaders of the major 
right-wing populist parties have openly called for violence against their perceived adversaries.  
Yet, while the parties in themselves do not represent a direct threat, they do pose an indirect 
threat through their toxic and inflammatory othering narratives that inspire individuals on the 
fringes to commit terrorist acts, as in the cases of attacks in Christchurch and El Paso. 
Based on the seven hypotheses discussed in this chapter, the greatest concern is not that right-
wing populist parties will turn to terrorism (Hypothesis 3).  Although, there is a risk right-wing 
parties could fragment (Hypothesis 4 and 5), with the more extreme elements, cell, or individual 
choosing a pathway towards terrorism.  Disillusioned supporters may see the only acceptable 
option to changing the distribution of power or demonstrating political resolve is to commit acts 
of violence.  Additionally, there is the potential of the presence of right-wing or an increase in 
right-wing violence contributing to a spiraling effect of violence between right-wing extremists 
and their ideological protagonists (Hypotheses 6 & 7).  But for now, based on the research 
presented in this paper, the most likely implication of the rise of right-wing populism and its 
effect on domestic terrorism in the EU is it will inspire lone actors to conduct attacks with the 
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Appendix 1: Terrorist Attacks in the EU by Affiliation (2015-2018) 
 




Appendix 2: European Union Membership 
 
(European Union, 2019; Der Spiegel, 2019, June 27; BBC, 2019, May 24) 
* Ruling party or member of a governing coalition. 






Right-Wing Populist Parties in Government  
(% of Vote in most Recent Elections) 
Austria X X Freedom Party of Austria* (26%) 
Belgium X X Flemish Interest (3.7%) 
Bulgaria   United Patriots (9%), Volya 
Croatia    
Cyprus X  National Popular Front, or National People's / Ethniko 
Laiko Metopo (ELAM)(3.7%)  
Czech Republic  X Freedom and Direct Democracy (11%) 
Denmark  X Danish People’s Party (21%) 
Estonia X X Conservative People’s Party (17.8%) 
Finland X X Blue Reform*, Finns Party* (17.6%) 
France X X National Rally (13%) 
Germany X X Alternative for Germany (12.6%) 
Greece X X  
Hungary  X Fidesz*(49%), Jobbik*(19%) 
Ireland X   
Italy X X Lega*(17.4%) 
Latvia  X National Alliance (11%) 
Lithuania X  Order and Justice (7.6%) 
Luxembourg X  Alternative Democratic Reform Party (8.3%) 
Malta X   
Netherlands X  Freedom Party (13%) 
Poland  X Law and Justice (43.6%)* 
Portugal X X  
Romania    
Slovakia X X Slovak National Party (8%) 
Slovenia X X Slovenian National Party (4%)* 
Spain X X Vox (10.3%) 
Sweden  X Sweden Democrats (17.5%) 
United 
Kingdom** 
  UK Independence Party (12.6% prior to Brexit vote, 
has since split to form), The Brexit Party 
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Appendix 3: Deadliest Terrorist Attacks in Europe 
Date  Incident Country Group Causalities 




Babbar Khalsa (Sikh militants) 329 killed 
1988-12-21 
 
Pan Am Flight 103 Bombing 
 
UK (Scotland) State Sponsored, Libya 270 killed 
2004-03-11 Madrid Train Bombings Spain 
Homegrown cell, 








St Nedelya Church Bombing 
 
Bulgaria Bulgarian Communist 
 
150 killed,  
500+ injured 
 
2015-11-13 Paris Attacks France 
Homegrown cell, 
directed/inspired by ISIS 
 





















Black September Organization/ 






















Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionri 













































2005 London Bombings 
 









Swissair Flight 330 Bombing 
 
 
Switzerland Popular Front for the Liberation 
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France Organisation Armee Secrete 








JAT Flight 367 Bombing 
 



















Manchester Arena Bombing 
 
UK (England) 








Birmingham Pub Bombings 
 
























Homegrown cell, inspired by al-






El Descanso Bombing 
 
Spain 










Appendix 4: Terrorism Definitional Elements 
Definitional Element 
Schmid & Jongman 
Survey (1988) 
Frequency (%) 
Weinberg et al.  
Survey (2002) 
Frequency (%) 
Violence, force 83.5 71 
Political 65 60 
Fear, terror emphasized 51 22 
Threat 47 41 
Psychological effects and (anticipated) 
reactions 
41.5 5.5 
Victim-target differentiation 37.5 25 
Purposive, planned, systematic, organized 
action 
32 11 
Method of Combat, strategy, tactic 30.5 31.5 
Extranormality, in breach of accepted rules, 
without humanitarian constraints 
30 0 
Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance 28 5.5 
Publicity aspect 21.5 18 
Arbitrariness, impersonal, random character, 
indiscrimination 
21 0 
Civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, outsiders 
as victims 
17.5 22 
Intimidation 17 11 
Innocence of victims emphasized 15.5 10 
Group, movement, organization as 
perpetrator 
14 29 
Symbolic aspect, demonstration to other 13.5 5.5 
Incalculability, unpredictability, 
unexpectedness of occurrence of violence 
9 1 
Clandestine, covert, nature 9 7 
Repetitiveness, serial, or campaign character 
of violence 
7 0 
Criminal 6 5.5 
Demands made on third parties 4 1 




Appendix 5: Terrorist/Extremist Categories and Definitions 
Categories and definitions used by the US Department of Homeland Security to describe differing 
forms of terrorism.   
Anarchists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence as a means of 
changing the government and society in support of the belief that all forms of 
capitalism and corporate globalization should be opposed and that governing 
institutions are unnecessary and harmful to society.    
Animal Rights Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed against 
people, businesses, or government entities perceived to be exploiting or abusing 
animals. 
Anti-Abortion Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed against 
the providers of abortion-related services, their employees, and their facilities in 
support of the belief that the practice of abortion should end. 
Black Supremist Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence as a means to 
oppose racial integration and/or to eliminate non-black people and Jewish people.  
Domestic Terrorism Any act of violence that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of 
critical infrastructure or key resources committed by a group or individual based 
and operating entirely within the United States or its territories without direction 
or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group.  The act is a violation of the criminal 
laws of the United States or of any state or other subdivision of the United States 
and appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the 
conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.  A 
domestic terrorist differs from a homegrown violent extremist in that the former is 




Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence against people, 
businesses, or government entities perceived to be destroying, degrading, or 
exploiting the natural environment.    
Facilitators Groups or individuals who knowingly provide one or more of a wide array of 
services to other operatives that enable the execution of terrorist plots, training, 
travel, or financing. Such activity might include setting up bank accounts, 
acquiring or producing false identification or travel documentation, aiding travel, 
disbursing funds, procuring materials, or enabling communications via electronic 
means or couriers.  A facilitator who participates in a conspiracy without knowing 
the final object of the conspiracy, or even knowing that a conspiracy exists, 
should be referred to as an unwitting co-optee. 
Homegrown Violent Extremist 
(HVE) 
HVE is a person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the 
US or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in 
ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to 
terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign 
terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign 
terrorist organization.  HVEs are distinct from traditional domestic terrorists who 
engage in unlawful acts of violence to intimidate civilian populations or attempt 
to influence domestic policy without direction from or influence from a foreign 
actor.  
Lone Offender An individual motivated by one or more extremist ideologies who, operating 
alone, supports or engages in acts of violence in furtherance of that ideology or 
ideologies that may involve influence from a larger terrorist organization or a 
foreign actor.    
Militia Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed at 
federal, state, or local government officials or infrastructure in response to their 
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belief that the government deliberately is stripping Americans of their freedoms 
and is attempting to establish a totalitarian regime.  These individuals 
consequently oppose many federal and state authorities’ laws and regulations, 
(particularly those related to firearms ownership), and often belong to armed 
paramilitary groups.  They often conduct paramilitary training designed to 
violently resist perceived government oppression or to violently overthrow the US 
Government. 
Racist Skinhead Extremists Groups or individuals who are a sub-category of white supremacist extremists that 
facilitate, support, or engage in acts of violence directed towards the federal 
government, ethnic minorities, or Jewish persons in support of their belief that 
Caucasians are intellectually and morally superior to other races and their 
perception that the government is controlled by Jewish persons.  Racist skinheads 
consider themselves to be the frontline soldiers of white supremacist extremists, 
and frequently distinguish themselves from other violent white supremacist 
extremists by a distinctive style of dress. 
Radicalization The process through which an individual change from a non-violent belief system 
to a belief system that includes the willingness to actively advocate, facilitate, or 
use violence as a method to effect societal or political change. 
Sovereign Citizen Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed at 
public officials, financial institutions, and government facilities in support of their 
belief that the legitimacy of US citizenship should be rejected; almost all forms of 
established government, authority, and institutions are illegitimate; and that they 
are immune from federal, state, and local laws. 
Terrorism Any activity involving an act that is dangerous to human life or potentially 
destructive to critical infrastructure or key resources, and is a violation of the 
criminal laws of the United States or of any state or other subdivision of the 
United States and appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian 
population to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or 
to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or 
kidnapping. 
Unwitting Co-optees Groups or individuals who provide support to terrorism without knowing that 
their actions are contributing to terrorism.  Such individuals may suspect that they 
are being used.  Not all unwitting co-optees are engaging in criminal behavior 
White Supremacist Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed at the 
federal government, ethnic minorities, or Jewish persons in support of their belief 
that Caucasians are intellectually and morally superior to other races and their 
perception that the government is controlled by Jewish persons.    
 
(Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 2011, pp. 1-3) 
